CLYDE
OFF SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

THIS OFF SITE EMERGENCY PLAN IS DESIGNED TO COVER
RADIATION EMERGENCIES AT
HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE
AND THE FASLANE, COULPORT and LOCH GOIL BERTHS
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## SECTION 1 – ADMINISTRATION OF THE PLAN

### 1.1 EXERCISE / EVENT RECORD

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<td>2006 – 22/23 November</td>
<td>Short Sermon 2006</td>
<td>Two day LIVE multi-agency exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009 – 2 September</td>
<td>Short Sermon 2009</td>
<td>One day LIVE multi-agency exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012 – 5 September</td>
<td>Short Sermon 2012</td>
<td>One day LIVE multi-agency exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014 – 25 November</td>
<td>Long Sermon</td>
<td>Multi-agency recovery exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 – 2 September</td>
<td>Evening Star 2015</td>
<td>One day LIVE multi-agency exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016 – 10 October</td>
<td>Extendibility Workshop</td>
<td>Multi-agency Extendibility event</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 – February</td>
<td>ONR Redetermination</td>
<td>Redetermination carried out by ONR</td>
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<tr>
<td>2018 – August</td>
<td>Evening Star 2018</td>
<td>One day LIVE multi-agency exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 – August</td>
<td>Nuclear Training</td>
<td>Workshop prior to exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 – August</td>
<td>Evening Star L1</td>
<td>Training and familiarisation</td>
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<td>2020 – March</td>
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<td>REPPIR 2019 Workshop</td>
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### 1.2 REVIEW / AMENDMENT RECORD

The plan must be regularly reviewed to ensure the emergency arrangements remain relevant and appropriate and meet each agency’s requirements in order that the aims of the plan are achieved.

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<td>2006 – November</td>
<td>Completely re-organise and update</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 – September</td>
<td>Complete update – regulation changes</td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 – March</td>
<td>Update to reflect adoption of submarine Reference Accident methodology for nuclear emergency response</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 – August</td>
<td>Few pages updated in preparations for Exercise Evening Star 2015</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 – August (2)</td>
<td>Further updates required before exercise Evening Star</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 – July</td>
<td>General update and Redetermination outcomes</td>
<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 – January</td>
<td>Post exercise update</td>
<td>2019 (new Regs)</td>
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<td>2020 – May</td>
<td>REPPIR 2019 Compliance</td>
<td>2021</td>
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<td>HM Naval Base, Clyde</td>
<td>Emergency Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office for Nuclear Regulation</td>
<td>Nominated Site Inspector Clyde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argyll and Bute Council</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies</td>
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<td><strong>Emergency Services</strong></td>
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<td>Police Scotland</td>
<td>Emergency Planning West</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Scotland</td>
<td>‘L’ Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Fire and Rescue Service</td>
<td>Local Senior Officer, GC EWDAB CCO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Ambulance Service</td>
<td>West Resilience Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HM Coastguard</td>
<td>Area Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHS &amp; Health and Social Care Partnership</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and Social Care Partnership – HSCP</td>
<td>Assoc. Director Public Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS Highland</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHS Greater Glasgow &amp; Clyde</td>
<td>Head of Resilience</td>
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<td><strong>Scottish Government (Agencies)</strong></td>
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<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td>Resilient Essential Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scottish Government</td>
<td>WoSRRP Support Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal and Plant Health Agency – APHA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food Standards Scotland – FSS</td>
<td>Food Emergency Planning Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Scottish Environment Protection Agency – SEPA</td>
<td>Resilience Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health England – PHE (Centre for Radiological, Chemical &amp; Environmental Hazards)</td>
<td>Emergency response Grp Leader</td>
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<td><strong>Neighbouring Local Authorities</strong></td>
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<td>Highland Council</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>Stirling Council</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>West Dunbartonshire Council / Inverclyde Council</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Service</td>
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<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
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<td>British Telecom</td>
<td>Emergency Planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Loch Lomond &amp; Trossachs National Park Authority</td>
<td>Chief Executive</td>
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<td>Met Office</td>
<td>Senior Advisor</td>
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<td>Network Rail</td>
<td>Emergency Planning</td>
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<td>Area Officer</td>
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<td>Aquatrine (Viola Scottish Water)</td>
<td>Project Lead</td>
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## 1.4 GLOSSARY OF TERMS

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<td>CCA</td>
<td>Civil Contingencies Act 2014</td>
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<td>COBR</td>
<td>Cabinet Office Briefing Room. UK Government’s dedicated crisis management facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment – Primary</td>
<td>The compartment surrounding the Reactor Plant made up of the pressure hull of the submarine and internal bulkheads.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Containment – Secondary</td>
<td>The compartment within the submarine hull on either side of the primary containment that can prevent internal leakage from the primary containment to the atmosphere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordons – Inner</td>
<td>Surrounds the immediate scene and provides security within</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordons – Outer</td>
<td>Seals off an extensive area to which unauthorised persons have no access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decontamination</td>
<td>The removal of radioactive material from a person or a surface.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPZ</td>
<td>Detailed Emergency Planning Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Exposure</td>
<td>The exposure of an employee engaged in an activity of or associated with the response to a radiation emergency or a potential radiation emergency in order to bring help to endangered persons, prevent exposure of a large number of persons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs)</td>
<td>A range of intervention levels of averted dose to provide guidance on counter measures following a radiation emergency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusion Zone Reception Centre</td>
<td>Building / area designated for the management and processing of evacuated personnel from the exclusion zone.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEPA</td>
<td>Food &amp; Environment Protection Act 1985. FEPA powers are used to make emergency orders in relation to any hazard which poses/may pose a risk to human health through food.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSS</td>
<td>Food Standards Scotland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gamma Shine</td>
<td>The Gamma Radiation that would emanate directly from a submarine following a reactor accident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMCG</td>
<td>Her Majesties Coastguard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HPA</td>
<td>Health Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEM</td>
<td>Integrated Emergency Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY OF TERMS contd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intervention</strong></td>
<td>An activity that aims to prevent or reduce the radiation exposure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JRLO</strong></td>
<td>Joint Regional Liaison Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LRP</strong></td>
<td>Local Resilience Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MCA</strong></td>
<td>MOD Co-ordinating Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MDP</strong></td>
<td>Ministry of Defence Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Member of the public</strong></td>
<td>Any person not being: (i) a person for the time being present on premises where a radiation emergency can occur or where a radiation emergency has actually occurred, or (ii) a person engaged in an activity of or associated with the response to a radiation emergency;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NHS</strong></td>
<td>National Health Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NPW</strong></td>
<td>Nuclear Powered Warship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off-Site Emergency Plan</strong></td>
<td>An integrated emergency management plan to bring together the emergency arrangements of all of the responding organisations with a role in the response to a radiation emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>On-Site Emergency Plan</strong></td>
<td>The operators emergency plan for the premises as required under REPPIR 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ONR</strong></td>
<td>Office for Nuclear Regulation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Off-site Nuclear Emergency - OSNE</strong></td>
<td>A hazardous condition which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outline Planning Zone (OPZ)</strong></td>
<td>Set area beyond the detailed emergency planning zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>QHM</strong></td>
<td>Queens Harbour Master</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stable iodine tablets (SITS)</strong></td>
<td>Tablets containing stable iodine, which would minimise the uptake of radioactive iodine into the thyroid gland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Radiation Emergency</strong></td>
<td>A non-routine situation or event arising from work with ionising radiation that necessitates prompt action to mitigate the serious consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reactor Safety Alert - RSA</strong></td>
<td>An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for reactor plant safety’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representative Accidents</strong></td>
<td>Bounding cases that assessments show require detailed planning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**GLOSSARY OF TERMS contd.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>REPPIR</td>
<td>The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPID</td>
<td>Rural Payments and Inspections Division – Scottish Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAS</td>
<td>Scottish Ambulance Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCC / SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Co-ordination Centre / Strategic Co-ordination Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPA</td>
<td>Scottish Environment Protection Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGLO</td>
<td>Scottish Government Liaison Officer - A member of the Scottish Government Liaison Team deployed to the multi-agency co-ordination centre – COSC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGoRR</td>
<td>Scottish Government Resilience Room – A co-ordination facility of the SG that is activated in cases of national emergency or crisis, or during international events with major implications for Scotland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAC</td>
<td>Science and Technical Advice Cell – A group of technical experts from those agencies involved in an emergency response that may provide scientific and technical advice to LRP Strategic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.5 TERMS OF REFERENCE / AIM OF THE PLAN

This plan has been prepared in consultation with all recipients and reflects the corporate approach to Integrated Emergency Management (IEM).

In the Police Scotland area, the overarching responsibility for ensuring effective management of civil protection measures resides within West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership (WoSRRP), as required by the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2004. The Group membership consists of Category 1 and Category 2 responders, the former pertaining to the emergency services, local authorities, National Health Service (NHS) boards and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA). Category 2 responders include utilities, telecommunications and transport organisations.

In general terms, the WoSRRP aims to ensure effective management of multi-agency preparation and response to emergencies which may have a significant impact within the WoSRRP area. The WoSRRP will achieve this by promoting sound partnership working, developing a united emergency management framework to ensure that all partners are prepared for response to any emergency. It will further endeavour to fulfil its civil contingencies responsibilities by following the concepts of resilience, underpinned by IEM as contained within Preparing Scotland.

Whilst the plan sets out arrangements for dealing with a radiation emergency, and includes the main requirements of responding agencies, it will be necessary for detailed/complementary instructions to be promulgated internally within agencies.

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. To produce a corporate emergency off-site plan for HM Naval Base, Clyde and its associated nuclear Operational Berths in the Clyde area, promoting mutual understanding of roles, identification of responsibilities and co-ordination of response of the Site Operator.
2. To ensure the emergency arrangements remain relevant and appropriate and meet agencies requirements in order to achieve the aim of the plan.
3. To ensure the arrangements meet the requirements of the Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations (REPPIR) 2019.
4. To implement the measures necessary to protect persons and the environment from the effects of radiation emergencies.
5. To provide for the restoration of the environment after a radiation emergencies.
6. To communicate the necessary information to the public and to the emergency services and authorities concerned in the area.

AIM OF THE PLAN

1. Safeguard the public in the event of a radiation emergency at any sites in this plan.
2. Protect property.
3. Safeguard the environment.
5. Restore normality.
6. Return to existing exposure situation
7. Prioritising keeping effective doses below defined reference levels.
1.6 INTRODUCTION

The Royal Navy operates a flotilla of nuclear powered submarines, which form a vital element of the defence of the UK. The nuclear reactor offers the submarine a level of speed and underwater endurance, which cannot be achieved by any alternative method of propulsion.

Nuclear power is the only mechanism available to allow HM Submarines to carry out elements of the Navy’s task in support of the UK’s independent nuclear deterrent, anti-submarine warfare and in the protection of maritime routes.

The nuclear safety of naval reactors is given the highest priority and their design, operation and maintenance is authorised by the Secretary of State for Defence through approved naval regulations. A specialist committee, the Defence Nuclear Safety Committee (DNSC), whose membership includes independent nuclear and radiation safety experts from the civil nuclear industry, advises on these matters.

The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 - (REPPiR) requires an assessment of the hazards associated with these operations to be undertaken.

The plan describes the extent of potential hazards, what emergency countermeasures will be taken to reduce the risk to the public and explains the roles and responsibilities of the responding organisations.

The arrangements for the response to a nuclear weapon emergency are restricted to and contained in the operators site plan.

Argyll and Bute Council is affiliated to the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership (WoSRRP) which encourages support/co-ordination at a local level, ensuring all relevant agencies have been involved in producing this plan.

Civil Contingencies Unit
Argyll and Bute Council
SECTION 2 – THE PREMISES – HAZARD DETAILS

2.1 SITE DETAILS

HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane)
Faslane, Argyll and Bute, G84 8HL
Tel: 01436 674321
Contact Duty Naval Base Officer – Base Extension

HM Naval Base Clyde (Coulport)
Royal Naval Armaments Depot, Coulport, Argyll and Bute, G84 0PD
Tel: 01436 674321
Contact Depot Executive Officer (DEO) – Base Extension

Loch Goil Nuclear Operational Berth
Contacts as for HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane)

2.2 FUNCTION / DESCRIPTION

HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane)

HMNB Clyde (Faslane) is the Royal Navy’s main presence in Scotland. It is home to the core of the Submarine Service, including the nation’s nuclear deterrent, and the new generation of hunter-killer submarines.

HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) regularly plays host to other Royal Navy vessels (surface ships and submarines) from other United Kingdom bases, as well as other nation's nuclear powered submarines and surface ships.

Classed as a nuclear authorised site, maintenance and defect rectification on nuclear submarines and support facilities is permitted within HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) subject to the most stringent safety controls.

HM Naval Base Clyde (Coulport)

The Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, 3.2km from Faslane submarine berths, is responsible for the storage, processing, maintenance and issue of key elements of the UK’s Trident Deterrent Missile System and the ammunitioning of all submarine embarked weapons.

The holding, movement and transfer of weapons on the site and the maintenance of nuclear support facilities are subject to the most stringent of safety controls.
Loch Goil Operational Berth

Loch Goil is a remote sea loch opening west from Loch Long. It plays host to a nuclear operational berth/mooring, predominantly used for the purpose of submarine acoustic trials.

No nuclear work routinely takes place on submarines while berthed in Loch Goil.

2.3 ACCESS POINTS

Information on access points for all three sites is contained in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 to this section.

2.4 ROAD ACCESS

Information on road access for all three sites is contained in Annexes 1, 2, and 3 to this section.

2.5 REACTOR ACCIDENTS

In the unlikely event of a nuclear emergency, the main hazard associated with nuclear reactors would come from the release of fission products from the fuel. In order to prevent this, reactor fuel is encased in strong and very high integrity cladding. In addition, there are further barriers designed to contain the fission products should an emergency situation develop. In the first instance, should the cladding fail, the primary circuit, which is a closed loop, would contain the fission products and prevent further spread.

Beyond the primary circuit, the submarine’s Reactor Compartment (RC) is designed and constructed to meet the severe rise in pressure that could result from the very unlikely event of a complete failure of the primary circuit. This barrier to the release of fission products is termed the Primary Containment Boundary. Pipes, ducts and other penetrations between the primary containment boundary and the remainder of the submarine are designed to be shut off automatically. In the event these boundaries were to allow a proportion of fission products to release slowly through the Primary Containment Boundary, they would still be largely contained within the volume of the submarine.

The submarine pressure hull is designed to withstand both the high pressures experienced at deep diving depth, along with potential for battle shock and is therefore highly engineered and tested to exacting high integrity standards. A reactor comprised within the hull of a nuclear submarine is therefore required to be considerably more assured of withstanding environmental safety challenges than for civil reactor plants. The submarine’s pressure hull is referred to as the Secondary Containment Boundary.

Detailed assessments of potential emergencies and their associated consequences have been carried out by MOD in accordance with statutory requirements. These assessments presume concurrent failures of all of the safety barriers, preventing core cooling leading to fuel melt and subsequent leakage through all four of the containment barriers previously described. This has led to the identification of worst case emergency which although highly unlikely is termed the Representative Accidents. The characteristics of the Representative Accident are as follows –

- A number of cautious assumptions are made about the radioactive material inventory and other characteristics of the reactor
- A leak occurs in the primary cooling circuit of the reactor which cannot be isolated and which is beyond the capacity of the coolant make up systems
- A series of extremely unlikely engineering and other failures also occur
The primary coolant leak coupled with the engineering and other failures lead to damage to the fuel within the reactor after >3 hours, resulting in elevated gamma radiation levels around the reactor.

The fuel damage in turn releases some radioactive material from the reactor. This is largely contained within the submarine but a small proportion may be released to the environment over the following 1 to 2 days.

The radioactive material would be carried downwind and would therefore present a hazard in the downwind sector only. This hazard would arise principally via inhalation initially.

The Representative Accident analysis determines a period of approximately 3.5 hours from the onset of the initial event (a 15mm unisolable leak) to the onset of radiological hazard.

REPPIR identifies that the consequences of a Representative Accidents defined in this way, constitute an appropriate basis for the design of detailed emergency response plans for the protection of both the workforce, and the public who may be affected by a nuclear emergency. Further plans drawn up in this way then provide a suitable basis for dealing with even less likely but potentially more severe consequences, through the concept of extendibility.

Definitions

The only reactor emergency that can result in a hazard to personnel outside the Nuclear Powered Warship (NPW) is one that leads to a significant release of the fission products normally retained within the reactor fuel.

The general definitions and associated guidance concerning a Reactor Safety Alert (RSA) and an OSNE are as follows -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Definitions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reactor Safety Alert (RSA)</td>
<td>An abnormal event which poses a potential threat to, or causes serious concern for, reactor plant safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Off-site Nuclear Emergency (OSNE)</td>
<td>A hazardous condition which requires the implementation of urgent countermeasures to protect the public.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSNE Qualifiers</td>
<td><strong>Radiation Hazard Confirmed</strong> – an off-site Nuclear Emergency in which a radiation hazard has been detected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Release of Radioactive Material Confirmed</strong> – an off-site nuclear emergency in which a release of radioactive material to the environment has been detected.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.6 CONSEQUENCES REPORT

The recommended distances from the operator assessment of hazards are as follows:

a. 200 m from the submarine in all directions - controlled evacuation of the immediate area around the submarine (NB: No member of the public would be expected to be within this area).

b. 400 m from the submarine in all directions – personnel to shelter indoors within the first few hours.

c. 1.5 km from the submarine in the downwind sector - provision and consumption of stable iodine tablets (SITs) within the first few hours.

d. 1.5 km from the submarine in the downwind sector - sheltering indoors within the first few hours.

The major off-site hazards in the event of an OSNE are due to the cloud-shine and inhalation of radioactive materials.

The declaration of OSNE is the trigger for implementing countermeasures.

In terms of this off-site emergency plan, there are six specific berths at HMNB Clyde (Faslane) Authorised Site, and these will be considered to form a basis of a single emergency planning area with a combined 1.5km radius from each of the berths.

The National Reference Level for the public is set at 100mSv. This includes the dose from both the response and recovery phase over the first year following an accident.

2.7 RADIATION AND CONTAMINATION DEFINITIONS

Radiation and Contamination

In order to understand the hazards of a reactor emergency, it is important to appreciate the meaning of and differences between the terms radiation and contamination.

Even in a situation where the fission products remain contained, the penetrating radiation that they give off may still irradiate people in the vicinity. This is termed a radiation hazard.

Protection against radiation hazards is afforded by, reducing the time people spend close to the fission products, placing shielding between the individual and the radiation source or increasing the distance between the individual and the source.

If however, personnel became contaminated with fission products, either on the surface of their body or internally by breathing, eating or drinking, then the subjects carrying the source of radiation around with them would continue to be irradiated until that source was removed. This is termed a contamination hazard.

Some protection against such a hazard can be afforded by the use of protective clothing. Skin contamination can normally be removed by simple washing.

The Hazards

Following an OSNE involving the release of fission products outside the primary circuit, there are 2 distinct ways by which people could be irradiated:-

a) Gamma radiation from fission products retained within the submarine containment boundaries would be transmitted in all directions through the vessels hull. Both shielding and distance from the submarine would diminish...
the intensity of this pure radiation hazard. However people within, or in close proximity to the vessel could be exposed to high levels of radiation. This hazard is referred to as **Hull Gamma Shine**.

b) Less likely is the release of some of the fission products from the NPW to the atmosphere or into the water. The release of fission products, the actual radioactive material, constitutes both a radiation and contamination hazard.

**Biological effects of radiation**

It is the ionising radiation given off by the fission products that would pose the hazard following any reactor emergency. As the radiation passes through the human body, ionisation events occur which may damage or kill cells. The body is of course being subjected continuously to natural background radiation and has well developed repair processes to deal with radiation damage.

Different human cell types have very different radiation sensitivities, but if the radiation dose is great enough and large numbers of cells are killed; signs and symptoms of acute radiation exposure would appear. These acute radiation effects include skin burns and most severely death, but all have a defined threshold of dose below which the effect will not take place.

At radiation doses below the thresholds, acute effects cannot occur, although cells may have been damaged with the result that exposed individuals have a statistically increased risk of development of cancer in years to come. For radiation protection purposes, the increased risk of these effects is assumed to be directly proportional to the radiation dose, without any threshold.

### 2.8 PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC FROM THE HAZARDS OF AN OSNE

**Management**

If an OSNE were to occur, emergency procedures would be followed by the submarine crew and shore engineering support with the aim of preventing or minimising core damage, maintaining the integrity of containment in order to prevent or minimise any release of fission products. This management strategy would form an important element in the overall protection of the public.

**Emergency Countermeasures**

In the highly unlikely event of an OSNE, increases in the radiation level above natural background would result and probably continue for a period, which could be shortened if some form of intervention was to take place. For a serious reactor emergency, intervention to reduce doses could be required in the form of emergency countermeasures being implemented in the surrounding area. The implementation of widespread countermeasures, even in accordance with a preplanned scheme, is not a risk-free activity. It follows that there must be some criteria on which to base any decision to take such measures following a reactor emergency.

The criteria for the implementation of emergency countermeasures following an OSNE are based on the principles that the countermeasures should achieve more good than harm, and that introduction and withdrawal of the measures should be aimed to provide optimum protection. It is the risk to the individual, which is considered of greatest importance in determining the need for emergency countermeasures. The basic requirements for implementation criteria are as follows: –

a) Countermeasures should be introduced to ensure that no individual suffers acute effects from radiation.

b) The increase in probability of the individual suffering effects from radiation exposure in the absence of the countermeasures, should be balanced against the
detriment from the countermeasures itself to determine the optimum protection of the individual.

c) Within the UK, Public Health England - Centre for Radiation, Chemicals and Environmental Hazards (PHE-CRCE) provides guidance on emergency countermeasures to protect the public following an OSNE. Basic methods of reducing radiation exposure such as time, distance and shielding are still relevant in the mass countermeasure situation but they are incorporated into three countermeasures that are applicable to a population –

d) **SHELTER** – The public remaining in-doors with doors and windows closed and any ventilation systems shut-off.

e) **STABLE IODINE ADMINISTRATION** – If tablets containing stable iodine (non-radioactive) are taken prior to, or within a few hours of internal contamination with radioactive iodine, the resultant radiation dose to the thyroid gland would be substantially reduced.

f) **EVACUATION** – In the context of OSNE contingency planning, the term evacuation refers to the movement of people out of an area as an emergency measure to provide short-term protection for durations of up to a few days. If carried out prior to the existence of any hazard, evacuation would prevent almost all the radiation exposure that would have resulted. The adverse effects and difficulties of population evacuation, however, are significantly greater than shelter.

### 2.9 OUTLINE PLANNING ZONE

Assessments of the consequences of radiation emergencies demonstrate that emergency countermeasures would only be required beyond the DEPZ in the improbable event of a large release of fission products to the atmosphere.

The probability of this event is so low that detailed emergency plans are not proportionate and commensurate to the risk. However, in view of the need for some pre-planning to be carried out in order to achieve effective implementation should the need arise, the Secretary of State has determined the Outline Planning Zone (OPZ) at 5km.

The zone extends to 5km in all directions around the DEPZ but following an emergency it is anticipated that the requirement for countermeasures would be confined to the downwind sector only.

The factors which would cause outline planning to be triggered include technical assessments of the emergency situation or monitoring results suggesting urgent protective actions were required to a distance greater than the extend of the detailed emergency planning zone.
ANNEX 1 – HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE (FASLANE)

1. General

Faslane Bay is encompassed within HM Naval Base Clyde, which is the primary operating base for Royal Navy nuclear powered submarines. Classed as a nuclear authorised site, maintenance and defect repair work on nuclear submarines and submarine support facilities is permitted within the Base, subject to the most stringent safety controls.

The Base extends in a linear pattern north to south down the east shore of the Gareloch. Other than the small town of Garelochhead, and concentrated dwellings at Shandon, civilian residences are generally scattered and located along both shores of the loch. Hill farming, grazing and dairy farming are undertaken in the local area. Depending on the extent of the emergency neighbouring local authority areas could also be affected. There are no private water supplies within 1.5km.

2. Berths Locations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authorised Nuclear Berth</th>
<th>Grid Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Associated Mapping

4. Vulnerable Groups

There are two main vulnerable groups within the combined 1.5km boundary from the Faslane berths, a nursery and a residential home.

In addition, the Faslane Peace Camp is located within approx. 200 metres of the south east boundary. The Peace Camp consists of caravans and wooden built structures. The residents are transient in nature, with occupation numbers varying throughout the year. Due to the nature of the buildings not offering the same protection as a brick built dwelling, it is felt necessary to include this group in the emergency planning area.
For the purposes of this document ‘Other Facilities of Interest’ have also been included.

For further information on all of these groups, please see tables below -

### Vulnerable Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Site</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clyde Nursery</td>
<td>On declaration of OSNE, transport will be provided by HMNB Clyde to evacuate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lochside Care Home</td>
<td>Shelter or move to suitable alternative accommodation – consider circumstances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faslane Peace Camp</td>
<td>Distribution of SIT’s in the event of a radiation emergency if downwind sector.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Other ‘facilities of interest’ in the surrounding area of the Faslane Berths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facility</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scottish Water Complex</td>
<td>1.6 km</td>
<td>Water works facility comprising three buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garelochhead Train Station</td>
<td>1.6 km</td>
<td>Approximately 20 passenger movements per day</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garelochhead Primary School &amp; Playgroup</td>
<td>2.0 km</td>
<td>Relocation at declaration of any OSNE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RNAD – Coulport</td>
<td>3.2 km</td>
<td>Explosives Handling Jetty – Authorised site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhu &amp; Shandon Community Centre</td>
<td>4.8 km</td>
<td>Used by groups and clubs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE** – SIT’s will be distributed as per the HM Naval Base, Clyde, SIT’s Distribution Plan and advice to take these will only be on the agreement/advice of the Strategic team within the COSC.

### 5. Centres of Population nearby

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Approx. Distance (km)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Garelochhead</td>
<td>1.3 to 3.0</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhu and Shandon</td>
<td>2.0 &amp; 5.0</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clynder</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosneath</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>1,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helensburgh</td>
<td>5.0 to 6.5</td>
<td>15,610</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cove &amp; Kilcreggan</td>
<td>7.0 &amp; 9.0</td>
<td>1,414</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: NRS Mid 2016 population estimates for settlements.
6. Key Positions

Key Positions will be determined by wind direction with the aim of staying upwind of any potential hazard, but the following options have been identified.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FORWARD CONTROL POINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RENDEZVOUS POINT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE – ON-SITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE – OFF-SITE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clyde Off-site Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUPPORT CENTRE OPTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The most suitable support centre will be determined at the time of any emergency, according to the situation, by Argyll and Bute Council, and with the agreement of Police Scotland. Full details of premises are listed in the Argyll and Bute Council Emergency Centre Directory. Support Centres will be managed and staffed by officers from the Health and Social Care Partnership, supported by other services where necessary and appropriate Voluntary Agencies.

7. Inner Cordon

The inner cordon includes the sea area out to 400 metres, the A814 at the southern extremities of Garelochhead village and at the junction with HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) south access road, and the Glen Fruin road at 1.5km from the junction with the A814.

8. Outer Cordon

Police Scotland will determine the outer cordon after considering the nature of the incident, areas affected and advice regarding countermeasures.
9. On Site Nuclear Emergency Control
The on-site emergency response will be managed from the Incident Command and Control Centre (ICCC) within HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane). A fall back facility exists within HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) should the ICCC become untenable for any reason.

10. Off-Site Mitigation
Comprehensive arrangements for actions to be taken in mitigation of a radiation emergency are contained in Section 4.

11. Access Points
Access points will be by road using the North or South Gates of HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) and/or by water. The police will be given direction from the MCA as to which means of safe access is to be used.

12. Road Access
Road access to HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) will be from the A814 from the north or south.

13. Traffic Control Points
The following traffic control points will be set up by Police Scotland:

1. At the A814, Shandon, at the entrance to the former St Andrews School.
2. At the roundabout north of Garelochhead training camp at the junction of the A814/A817 (Haul Road).
3. Glen Fruin Road at the military road known as Yankee Road.
4. At the B833 at its junction with the B782 (Garelochhead).
5. At the A8/Haul road junction for dispersal.

14. Designated Hospitals
NHS Highland / NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde (GGC), in conjunction with the Scottish Ambulance Service will designate receiving hospitals to meet the specific demands of a radiation emergency, the most likely being the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital.

Casualties who are contaminated and with serious injuries or suspected of having received high radiation doses will normally be dealt with in accordance with NHS arrangements at the designated receiving hospitals, except in circumstances where life threatening injuries require immediate treatment or stabilisation. In these circumstances this will be carried out at the nearest suitable hospital.
15. Faslane Map
ANNEX 2 – HM NAVAL BASE CLYDE (COULPORT)

1. General

The Royal Naval Armaments Depot at Coulport, 3.2 km from Faslane submarine berths, is responsible for the storage, processing, maintenance and issue of key elements of the UK’s Trident Deterrent Missile System and the ammunitioning of all submarine embarked weapons.

An Explosives Handling Jetty (EHJ) allows the safe transfer of weapons to and from shore facilities onto the submarine. Classed as part of the nuclear authorised site; no nuclear work routinely takes place on submarines while berthed in the EHJ, however, it can be considered by the EHJ Facility Operator. It is authorised by the Procedure Authorisation Group and is controlled by sufficient Safety Management Arrangements (SMAs).

The holding, movement and transfer of weapons on the site and the maintenance of nuclear support facilities are subject to the most stringent of safety controls.

2. Berth Location

3. Associated Mapping

4. Vulnerable Groups

There are no residential or commercial properties, or permanent vulnerable groups within the 1.5km boundary from the EHJ, nor are there any immediately adjacent permanent vulnerable groups near to the 1.5km boundary from the EHJ.

A caravan park is located at Glenfinart, which is approximately 3 km from the EHJ. During the summer months there can be significant numbers of pleasure craft on the waters of Loch Long, many originating from Ardentinny, south west of the EHJ, and some 3km from the EHJ.

There is a registered residential home located on the eastern side of the Rosneath peninsula on the shore of Gareloch. This is approximately 2.5km from the EHJ and is within the REPPIR emergency planning and prior information areas for the Faslane Authorised Site.

In addition, there are a very small number of properties that lie between 2 and 2.5km of the EHJ, with some of these lying on the eastern side of the Rosneath peninsula.
5. Centres of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Approx. Distance (km)</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ardentinny</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garelochhead</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Key Positions

Key positions will be determined by wind direction with the aim of staying upwind of any potential hazard, but the following options have been identified.

**FORWARD CONTROL POINT**

**RENDEZVOUS POINT**

**INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE – ON-SITE**

**INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE – OFF-SITE**

**EMERGENCY CENTRE OPTIONS**

The most suitable emergency centre will be determined at the time of any emergency, according to the situation, by Argyll and Bute Council, and with the agreement of Police Scotland. Full details of premises are listed in the Argyll and Bute Council Emergency Centre Directory. Emergency Centres will be managed and staffed by officers from the Health and Social Care Partnership, supported by other services where necessary and appropriate Voluntary Agencies.

7. Inner Cordon

The inner cordon out to 400 metres landward/seaward is within the depot perimeter.

8. Outer Cordon

The police will determine the outer cordon after considering the nature of the incident, areas affected and advice regarding countermeasures.

9. On-Site Emergency Control Centre

The on-site emergency response will be managed from the Depot Emergencies Headquarters (DEHQ) in Coulport.

10. Off-Site Mitigation

Comprehensive arrangements for action to be taken in mitigation of a radiation accident are contained in Section 4.
11. **Access Point**

Access to HM Naval Base Clyde (Coulport) will be via the Main Depot Gate.

12. **Road Access**

Road access is via the B833 off the A814 Helensburgh to Arrochar road.

13. **Designated Hospitals**

NHS Highland / NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde (GGC) in conjunction with the Scottish Ambulance Service will designate receiving hospitals to meet the specific demands of a nuclear emergency, the most likely being the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital.

Casualties who are contaminated and with serious injuries or suspected of having received high radiation doses will normally be dealt with in accordance with NHS Highland arrangements at designated receiving hospitals, except in circumstances where life threatening injuries require immediate treatment or stabilisation. In these circumstances this will be carried out at the nearest suitable hospital.
14. Coulport Map
ANNEX 3 - LOCH GOIL

1. General

Loch Goil is a remote sea loch opening west of Loch Long which plays host to a nuclear operational berth/mooring. Predominantly used for the purpose of submarine acoustic trials, no nuclear work routinely takes place on submarines while berthed in Loch Goil.

The population of the area is sparse, although the transient population may increase sharply in the tourist season. Farming in the area consists of hill farming and grazing, mainly sheep with a few cattle. There are no dairy farms within the area. Small quantities of white fish and shellfish are harvested from the loch.

There are no private water supplies within 1.5km of the berth.

2. Berth Location

The Berth/mooring is located at Grid Reference

Associated Mapping
Ordnance Survey Map

3. Vulnerable Groups

There are no vulnerable groups adjacent to the boundary that are required to be included in the emergency planning and prior information areas around the Loch Goil Operational Berth.

The closest vulnerable groups are between approximately 2.5 and 3.5km away from the berth point. These being –

- Lochgoilhead National Activity Centre (young person’s activity centre)
- Lochgoilhead Primary School
- Drimsynie Holiday Park (caravans and lodges, in excess of 400)

In addition the Lodge Hotel and wedding venue has 7 rooms, a restaurant and can accommodate up to 70 reception guests (day time only).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other facilities of interest in the surrounding area of the Faslane Berths</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loch Goil Cruisers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Centres of Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Approx. Distance - km</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lochgoilhead</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrick</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portincaple</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garelochhead</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>3,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Key Positions

Key positions will be determined by wind direction with the aim of staying upwind of any potential hazard, but the following options have been identified.
FORWARD CONTROL POINT

RENDEZVOUS POINT

INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE, ON-SITE
DEHQ

INCIDENT CONTROL CENTRE, OFF-SITE
COSC Rhu

EMERGENCY CENTRE OPTIONS

| Lochgoilhead Centre (Scout Association) | Hall Road, Lochgoilhead | 01301 703217 |

Should the above not be suitable, the most suitable alternative emergency centre will be determined at the time of any emergency, according to the situation, by Argyll and Bute Council, and with the agreement of Police Scotland. Full details of premises are listed in the Argyll and Bute Council Emergency Centre Directory. Emergency Centres will be managed and staffed by officers from the Health and Social Care Partnership, supported by other services where necessary and appropriate Voluntary Agencies.

6. **Inner Cordon**
The 400 metre inner cordon mainly covers forest area.

8. **Outer Cordon**
The police will determine the requirements for an outer cordon, ashore after considering the nature of the incident, areas affected and advice regarding countermeasures.

9. **On-Site Emergency Control Centre**
The on-site emergency response will be managed from the ICCC in HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane).

10. **Off-Site Mitigation**
Comprehensive arrangements for action to be taken in an emergency are contained in Section 4.

11. **Access Points**
In the event of a nuclear emergency access will be controlled by the Queens Harbour Master (QHM) and HM Coastguard and will be gained from the following:-

   a)   HM Naval Base Clyde, Coulport;
b) HM Naval Base Clyde, Faslane;
c) QinetiQ Noise Range Testing Facility, Loch Goil.

12. **Road Access**

Road access is from the B839 off the A83 Arrochar to Inveraray Road.

13. **Designated Hospitals**

NHS Highland / NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde (GGC), in conjunction with the Scottish Ambulance Service will designate receiving hospitals to meet the specific demands of an incident, the most likely being the Queen Elizabeth University Hospital.

Casualties who are contaminated and with serious injuries or suspected of having received high radiation doses will normally be dealt with in accordance with NHS Highland arrangements, except in circumstances where life threatening injuries require immediate treatment or stabilisation. In these circumstances this will be carried out at the nearest suitable hospital.
15. Loch Goil Map
SECTION 3 – ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTING ON-SITE RESPONSE

3.1 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS – AT THE EMERGENCY SITE

The automatic countermeasure zone is a circle of radius 400m from the affected submarine, however, the on-site plans cover the whole of HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) or HM Naval Base Clyde (Coulport) site.

The MOD (HM Naval Base Clyde) has produced an “Operators On-Site Emergency Plan” for each location. This plan details the actions, roles and responsibilities of all personnel in response to a nuclear emergency and links directly with this Plan. The initial actions include but are not limited to the following:

- Alerting personnel on site
- Alerting external authorities
- Muster stations
- Issue of Stable Iodine Tablets where appropriate
- Dispersal of non-essential personnel from site

3.2 EMERGENCY WORKERS – DETAILED EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE (DEPZ)

The only persons that may be admitted to the DEPZ, i.e. the prevailing 1.5km downwind sector from the emergency submarine, are designated emergency workers. Which could include

- Ships Company;
- Members of civil emergency authorities, potentially Scottish Fire and Rescue Service, Scottish Ambulance Service and Police Scotland;
- Naval and Civil Radiation Monitoring Teams;
- Essential workers as necessary and authorised.

All emergency workers are to receive a safety briefing by their employers prior to entry to this area, or as soon as possible after the declaration of an emergency if they are required to remain within the site. The briefing will be specific to their task.

Police Scotland will not normally enter the area unless required to assist with implementation of public countermeasures, the security and preservation of evidence and the subsequent investigation. This being the case appropriate safety procedures will be followed. The radiological safety requirements for all personnel will be determined and implemented by the relevant officers at the COSC.

The SAS will be managed by the NHS cell within the COSC. The response will depend on the radiation and contamination hazards at the time. In the case of an incident requiring decontamination of injured personnel beyond the capabilities of the EZRC, the SAS would assume responsibility for the triage and decontamination of those affected. In responding to a radiation emergency, responsibilities can be summarised as follows:

a. the saving of life and the provision of immediate care to patients at the scene of the emergency and in transit to hospital;
b. the alerting of hospital services, immediate care GPs, and other relevant NHS agencies;
c. the evacuation of the injured personnel from the scene in order of medical priority;
d. arranging and ensuring the most appropriate means of transport for the injured to the receiving hospital;
e. the supply of patient care equipment to the scene of a major incident; and
f. to arrange the transportation of appropriate medical staff and their equipment to the scene of a major incident.”
SECTION 4 - INITIATION OF THE OFF-SITE RESPONSE

4.1 ACTIVATION OF THE OFF-SITE PLAN

An OSNE will be declared if it is determined that the implementation of off-site countermeasures will be beneficial to members of the public. It is the responsibility of the MOD to make this declaration and will be based on the advice provided by the on-site Incident Commander and his Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).

In the event of an OSNE being declared the HMNB Clyde Duty Naval Base Officer (DNBO) will initiate the Sites Nuclear Instructions which will activate the HMNB Clyde Site Operator Plan and the multi-agency Off-site Emergency Plan. On notification by the DNBO, Police Scotland will initiate the cascade alerting system to the relevant authorities to close up at the COSC.

CASCADE CALL OUT LIST

The following agencies will always be called out on the declaration of an OSNE -

- Police Scotland
- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service;
- Scottish Ambulance Service;
- Argyll and Bute Council;
- NHS Highland / NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde
- Scottish Government – WoSRRP Support Team
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency;
- Public Health England (PHE – CRCE)
- Food Standards Agency (who will in turn notify Food Standards Scotland)
- Animal and Plant Health Agency

Call out of the following will depend on the extent of the incident -

- Met Office
- HM Coastguard (HMCG)
- Scottish Water
- Network Rail
- British Telecom.
- Other neighbouring local Authorities

Police Scotland Service Overview will initiate the cascade call out for agencies to attend at the Clyde Off-site Centre - COSC, Rhu. **HM Naval Base, Clyde** will immediately alert and activate all MOD specialist support in direct support of this Off-Site Emergency Plan.

The ongoing management and control of all required countermeasures will be co-ordinated by multi-agency groups at Strategic and Tactical levels from the COSC.

The emergency phase of the off-site response will be co-ordinated by the Strategic Incident Commander, Police Scotland and during the recovery phase will be co-ordinated by the Chief Executive, Argyll & Bute Council, or nominated representative.
Planning for the recovery phase is established immediately by the formation of the multi-agency Recovery Working Group, chaired by an appropriate Senior Officer, Argyll and Bute Council. For information on the Handover/Recovery see Section 7.

The provision of timely/effective health protection advice is the responsibility of a multi-agency group, namely the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and is chaired by an appropriate senior representative from NHS Highland.

4.2 OFF-SITE EMERGENCY CO-ORDINATION CENTRE

The co-ordination of the emergency response is the role of Police Scotland. To achieve this, Police Scotland, will appoint a Strategic Commander to co-ordinate the activities of the Local Resilience Partnership (LRP). A Police Tactical Commander will also be appointed to co-ordinate the tactical elements of the emergency response. For an OSNE the Strategic and Tactical elements of management will be located at the COSC, Rhu.

Agencies which will or may be represented at the COSC include:

- ONR;
- HM Naval Base Clyde - MOD Co-ordinating Authority;
- Ministry of Defence
- Police Scotland;
- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service;
- Scottish Ambulance Service;
- Argyll and Bute Council;
- NHS Highland / NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde;
- Scottish Government
- Scottish Government – WoSRPP Support Team;
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency - SEPA;
- Public Health England - Centre for Radiological, Chemical & Environmental Hazards;
- Food Standards Scotland

Once the Strategic Group have assessed the situation the following agencies may also attend at the COSC if required -

- HM Coastguard;
- Scottish Water;
- Met Office;
- Animal and Plant Health Agency;
- Other neighbouring Local Authorities
- Network Rail
- British Telecom
4.3 ROLES / MEMBERSHIP OF DECISION MAKING AND ADVISORY GROUPS

The purpose of this section is to clarify the role and composition of the various decision making and advisory groups and their interface during the emergency phase of an incident.

4.3.1 LRP - STRATEGIC

This senior group will only be composed of members whose role it is to make strategic decisions on behalf of their organisation. The group must be small and dynamic, coming together for focused meetings, and armed with sufficient information from their own agency to allow group strategic issues to be discussed and decisions made.

Therefore, the Chair must be proactive in politely asking anyone who shouldn’t be there to leave.

LRP STRATEGIC - ROLES OF MEMBERS

Police Strategic Incident Commander (Chief Constable or Duty ACC).

Chairs the LRP Strategic and co-ordinates the emergency response phase, towards the restoration of normality.

Police Tactical Commander ('L' Division Commander or representative)

Informs the LRP Strategic of all issues arising from the LRP Tactical Group requiring strategic direction, and implements the decisions of the LRP Strategic.

Police Media and Public Communications Representative

Advises the LRP Strategic on any key issues of public/media concern from all agencies and on the media/information strategy. Also, implements decisions of the LRP Strategic requiring dissemination of information to the public.

Chief Executive, Argyll and Bute Council (or nominated representative)

Supports the emergency services during the emergency phase of the emergency and advises the LRP Strategic matters pertaining to recovery. Also prepares to take over the co-ordination role from Police Scotland when the emergency phase is over.

Scottish Fire & Rescue Service – Strategic Commander (Duty Gold)

SFRS – Strategic Commander (Duty Gold) Advises the LRP on the SFRS capabilities and capacities and the wider UK FRS capabilities. Provides FRS strategic overview to enable suitable strategic decisions to be made.

Director of Public Health - NHS Highland

Informed by the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC), they advise the LRP Strategic on the effects of the emergency and the appropriate countermeasures to be implemented to protect the public and personnel.

MOD Co-ordinating Authority (HM Naval Base Clyde)

The MOD Coordinating Authority (MCA) is the appointed Nuclear Suitably Qualified and Experienced Person (NSQEP) Executive Director of the MOD’s operational response in the Clyde area. Providing detailed onsite information to the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) Commander on arrival and establish and maintain effective liaison and support throughout.
Scottish Government Liaison Officer (SGLO)

Provide advice and support to responder organisations within the off-site centre on devolved matters, and liaise with the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR).

IN ADDITION

The following officials will not sit at the table but MAY be required to support their Strategic representative:

- Police Staff Officer and/or Police Emergencies Procedure Adviser;
- Argyll and Bute Council - Chair of Recovery Working Group;
- Argyll and Bute Council - Chief Executive’s support officer

Police Strategic Minute Taker will also attend meetings. LRP Strategic meetings must be timed to support members’ attendance at LRP Tactical, STAC and RWG meetings.

Chair of the meeting may invite other agencies to attend the Strategic meeting if Strategic input is required.

In the recovery phase, after a formal handover to the Chief Executive of the Local Authority, all the above agencies will still be represented, but in the case of the Police, at a less senior level.

4.3.2. LRP - TACTICAL

The LRP Tactical will be chaired by the Police Tactical Commander and meet as soon as possible if the Strategic group meeting is delayed for any reason. Following this meeting the Police Tactical Commander will call meetings of the LRP Tactical as and when necessary to pass on strategic decisions and report issues/advice back to Strategic.

The role of the Tactical group is to implement the strategic decisions made by the Strategic group and is the principal forum where all agencies meet to assess information and implement measures. The following are key members of the LRP Tactical. Representatives from other agencies will join if / when appropriate. Specific roles of members are as follows:-

**LRP TACTICAL - ROLES OF MEMBERS**

**Police Tactical Commander**

Chairs LRP Tactical and manages all Police actions through the COSC Police cell.

**Scottish Fire and Rescue Service Senior Officer**

Manages all Scottish Fire and Rescue Service actions through the COSC Fire and Rescue cell.

**Assistant MOD Co-ordinating Authority – HM Naval Base, Clyde**

Provides specialist support to the MOD Co-ordinating Authority on the implementation of emergency countermeasures.

**Scottish Ambulance Service Senior Officer**

Manages all ambulance service activities through the COSC medical cell and communicates with the Ambulance Incident Commander.
Argyll and Bute Council Representative (Executive Director)
Manages all of the local authority activities through the local authority cell.

NHS Highland Representative
Manages all NHS activities for implementation of casualty care, public health countermeasures, and primary health care.

Scottish Government – Government Liaison Officer
Provide advice and support to responder organisations within the off-site centre on devolved matters, liaising with the Scottish Government Resilience Room – (SGoRR).

Other members
- Representative of the STAC;
- Representative of the Recovery Working Group;
- Representative of Food Standards Scotland.

Chair of the meeting may invite other agencies to attend the Tactical meeting if input required.

A Police Tactical Minute taker will attend meetings. LRP Tactical must be timed to support member’s attendance at LRP Strategic, STAC and RWG meetings.

4.3.3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL ADVICE CELL (STAC)
In the event of a radiation emergency, it is vital that the Police Strategic Commander and the LRP Strategic are given clear authoritative advice on the effects of the emergency on public health and on the appropriate off-site countermeasures to be implemented.

The STAC should have a standard core membership to ensure consistency and to support a rapid response. Thereafter the composition of the STAC can be tailored to reflect the nature, scope and scale of the specific incident, as agreed with the LRP Strategic or LRP Tactical Chair.

A meeting of the STAC core group should be held as quickly as possible to carry out initial health and environmental risk assessment and to identify the ongoing requirements for specialist advice to the Strategic and/or Tactical co-ordination groups. In some circumstances the initial STAC discussions and advice to the lead responder can be made by telephone. Adequate contact arrangements should therefore be in place.

STAC – ROLES OF MEMBERS

STAC Chair - The STAC should be chaired by a senior representative of the local NHS Board, normally the Director of Public Health Medicine or a Consultant in Public Health Medicine. The chair of the STAC may change as the incident progresses but only when there are no issues in relation to public health to consider.

It is recognised that operation of the STAC is more effective when the Chair is consistent. Changes in the Chair leads to ineffective operation of the STAC.

Deputy Chair - In order that co-ordinated work in the STAC group continues during periods when the Chair is reporting to the main LRP Strategic or to other groups, a member of the STAC should be identified to act as a deputy chair.

Leadership - The STAC chairperson should have the relevant skills/experience to chair complex technical meetings, in order to fulfil the remit of the group in providing
co-ordinated advice. The lead individual should be someone at an appropriate level of seniority within their agency.

Training - Ideally, STAC chairperson(s) should have undergone specific training to familiarise themselves with the requirements of the role.

Core members of the STAC:

- NHS – Director of Public Health/Consultant in Public Health Medicine;
- ONR;
- Local Authority – Environmental Health Manager;
- Police Scotland – as lead responder;
- Scottish Fire & Rescue Service – HAZMAT Officer and Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA);
- Public Health England - CRCE – Strategic Advisor;
- Food Standards Scotland (FSS);
- SEPA Representative.

Additional members may include:

- Dstl Radiation Adviser (covered by SOG HPA until arrival of Dstl).
- Dstl Health Physicist (covered by SOG HPA until arrival of Dstl).
- NHS Radiation Protection Adviser;
- Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA);
- Scottish Government;
- Scottish Water;
- Met office.

STAC meetings must be timed to support members’ attendance at LRP Strategic, LRP Tactical and RWG meetings.

Public Information from the various agencies represented at the STAC will be provided to the Public Communication Cell by the Chair or via the Strategic Group.

4.3.4. SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY GROUP FOR EMERGENCIES (SAGE)

It is anticipated that the SAGE will be activated in support of COBR for all nuclear emergencies where –

1) There has been an off-site release of radiological material,
2) An off-site release is considered possible or
3) There is an incident that has serious implications for the site itself and those on it.

SAGE will not sit at the COSC. It is anticipated that the STAC Chair would dial into SAGE meetings and vice versa.

During COBR activation, SAGE is responsible for co-ordinating and peer reviewing, as far as possible, scientific and technical advice to inform national-level decision-making. SAGE also supports Ministers in making evidence based decisions on key national policy questions. During a nuclear scenario, it is anticipated that SAGE will focus on three primary subject areas –

- Peer review of the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC),
- Horizon scanning (e.g. understanding how the situation may evolve),
- On-site technical diagnosis / prognosis.
Peer review of scientific advice
SAGE provides expert oversight of the scientific advice informing emergency response decision-making through its peer review function. **SAGE will and must have a close, collaborative and supportive working relationship with the STAC, which will advise the SCG at the local strategic level on protective measures.**

In this role, SAGE peer reviews and adds value to local scientific advice (and the information/assessments it is based upon), providing subsequent reassurance to COBR (and STAC itself) that this advice is appropriately shaping decisions. Despite the close working and information sharing between SAGE and STACs, STACs remain accountable to SCGs and does not in any circumstance become a sub-committee of SAGE, but remains focused on the advice requirements at the local level.

**Horizon scanning function**
SAGE’s horizon scanning function contributes to government’s responsibility to determine the likely development of the emergency, by using joint agency modelling and assessment (JAM) based on available scientific and technical data.

JAM delivery partners provide SAGE with an evolving but consolidated projection of how the event will develop. This allows government to ensure an effective response across a range of credible scenarios by preparing in advance for potential future events.

**Site technical diagnosis/prognosis**
This function requires SAGE to examine the events occurring at the nuclear site (or, if the event is transportation, the incident site) from a technical perspective, to understand the developing scenario and what is being done to bring the incident under control. Again, this will focus on understanding how events could unfold in the future. This will require close interaction and co-operation with the site operator (or carrier), STAC and nuclear regulator.

Communication between SAGE and STAC is essential to ensure a co-ordinated approach. The chairs of both SAGE and STAC should be in regular contact. The STAC chair will dial into SAGE and vice versa. The chair of SAGE will also dial directly into SGoRR meetings.

**Further information** - Nuclear Response Guide for the SAGE:
4.3.5. RECOVERY WORKING GROUP (RWG)

Although the role of the RWG comes into its own when the emergency phase is over, it is essential that recovery is considered as soon as it is apparent that off-site contamination is likely to occur. The RWG will therefore establish a core group at the outset of a radiation emergency.

The role of the RWG is to characterise the extent and nature of the off-site contamination, and identify options and strategies for clean-up of contamination and disposal of wastes, taking into account the principles of justification and optimisation.

It should identify priorities, timescales and costs for the options, propose options for consideration by the LRP Strategic and prepare plans for their implementation through the LRP Tactical. It will advise on/assess recovery monitoring and maintain records of actions.

During the emergency phase the RWG Chair will present advice directly to the LRP Strategic or through the Chief Executive Argyll and Bute Council. The membership of the RWG needs to be flexible to respond to the specific circumstances, but the core membership will be as follows:

**RWG - ROLES OF MEMBERS**

Recovery Working Group membership may include all/some of the following. The Chair of the Group will invite members on as appropriate.

**Argyll and Bute Council – Most appropriate Officer**

Chairs the RWG and ensures a deputy is identified.

**NHS Highland – Consultant in Public Health Medicine**

Health Advice.

**NHS Radiation Protection Adviser**

Provides specialist advice on health effects.

**Public Health England – Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards**

Provision of public protection advice and information.

**Scottish Environment Protection Agency**

Advice on effects on the environment.

**Scottish Government**

SGLO – provide advice and support to the Recovery Working Group.

**Animal and Plant Health Agency**

Provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of radiation on animal health/welfare and plant health.

**Food Standards Scotland**

Advice on contamination of the food chain.

**Scottish Water**

Advice on the effects on public water and wastewater.

**Police Scotland**

Assistance with maintaining public order
Scottish Fire and Rescue Service
Advice on the capabilities that the SFRS could deploy to support the Recovery Phase.

MOD Health Physicist
Advice on radiation monitoring results.

MOD
Provision of support to the Recovery Working Group.

Met Office
Plume characteristics.

**RWG meetings must be timed to support members’ input/attendance at LRP Strategic, LRP Tactical or STAC. RWG meetings may be facilitated at the COSC or at another location nearby.**

### 4.3.6. MEDIA / PUBLIC COMMUNICATIONS GROUP (PCG)

The overall responsibility for the co-ordination of provision of information to the public and response to the media lies with the police during the emergency phase. The police however must take account of the statutory responsibility placed on the local authority under the REPPiR to provide information on emergency countermeasures to the public affected in the event of a radiological accident.

It is vital therefore that there is close liaison between all organisations represented at the COSC on information management. The Media and Public Communications Group has two principal roles. Firstly, to implement the information dissemination requirements of the Strategic group, then secondly, to collate information and media briefing objectives for all main agencies, into an agreed strategy for the Police Media and Public Communications Manager.

In fulfilling these it must ensure not only that the local press briefings and conferences are coherent but also that information in briefings held by organisations out with the COSC, e.g. Scottish Ministers in Edinburgh and MOD Ministers in Whitehall does not conflict with information being given at the COSC.

All Public Communication messages prepared, must without exception be agreed by Strategic Group before releasing.

The membership of the group should encompass main agencies responsible for information to the Public. In particular it is essential that the following attend:-

**Police Scotland - Public Communications Manager**
Chair.

**Argyll and Bute Council - Communications Manager**
Council statutory information objectives (Lead in the recovery stage).

**MOD Senior Public Relations Officer**
MOD information objectives

**Scottish Government Media Representative**
Scottish Government objectives and links with Scottish Government Departments/Ministers.

Other agencies may be invited to attend the media cell for specific information.
4.3.7. SITE OPERATOR’S GROUP (SOG)

The purpose of the Site Operator’s Group is to provide coherent information on the course of the emergency on site to the MOD Co-ordinating Authority (for the LRP Strategic, the Assistant MOD Co-ordinating Authority (for the LRP Tactical), and to the MOD Information Manager (for the Media and Public Communications Group). The following will attend:

- Assistant MOD Co-ordinating Authority – Chair;
- Site Operators Group (SOG) Manager - Co-ordination;
- Fleet Technical Adviser - Progress of the emergency;
- Health Physics Cell - Effects of emergency on site;
- Response Force Co-ordinator;
- MOD Police.

Medicad advice about the situation on the Naval Base will be provided by the Medical Cell within the ICCC.

4.4 SCOTTISH / CENTRAL GOVERNMENT LIAISON

For a radiation emergency at a defence site in Scotland, the MOD is the Lead Government Department, however, the Scottish Government will lead on public protection, consequence management and recovery issues. MOD and Scottish Government will work closely together.

Resilience Co-ordinators from the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership will attend at the COSC to provide support for the LRP groups and to provide an additional means of communication with Scottish Government.

4.5 RADIATION MONITORING TEAMS

HM Naval Base Clyde has comprehensive fixed radiation monitoring equipment installed dockside to provide immediate indications and subsequent radiation monitoring.

A HM Naval Base Clyde Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (NEMT) will carry out immediate pre-determined monitoring strategies using portable radiation monitoring equipment at Loch Goil, Faslane and Coulport and external to the sites.

The NEMT will be supported by a significant number of additional specialist monitoring teams from the MOD, civil nuclear power authorities, government and scientific departments. These additional specialist monitoring teams will be co-ordinated by PHE – CRCE.

4.6 MEDICAL RESPONSE

The Scottish Ambulance Service provides support from the NHS to treat casualties in the first instance. Co-ordinating the NHS response lies with the lead NHS Board who may need to set up the following facilities to deal with the health needs of the affected population:

a) Screening Clinics:
   For **occupationally exposed personnel** of the emergency services.

b) Screening Clinics
   For **members of the public and service personnel**, within the emergency site, and possibly the DEPZ.

c) Emergency Centres:
   The provision of medical and psycho-social support personnel at emergency centres is co-ordinated by the NHS and Argyll & Bute Council through the Health and Social Care Partnership.
4.7 COMMERCIAL SHIPPING AND PLEASURE CRAFT IN THE AREA

Queens Harbour Master will be advised of any hazard to shipping from information gathering at the COSC during response. They will be responsible for implementing restrictions which may be necessary.

4.8 RECORDS TO BE KEPT

Comprehensive records are to be kept by all agencies involved in a nuclear emergency in order that the necessary information may be available for a subsequent inquiry to the cause and effects. The records are also needed to assist in dealing with any claims which may arise in connection with loss, damage or injury attributable to the emergency. In particular, the following information is required:

a) Times of reports or orders being given or received;

b) Times when other authorities are informed of occurrences;

c) Details of persons exposed to any hazard and doses received, if possible, in addition to their movements within affected areas;

d) Decisions taken and the information on which these decisions were based;

e) Weather conditions.

4.9 REGISTRATION OF PERSONS AFFECTED BY A NUCLEAR EMERGENCY

To provide evidence for possible claims for compensation many years after the occurrence of an emergency, members of the general public will be able to register the fact that they were in the affected area at the time of the OSNE. Details will be promulgated by the MOD when appropriate.

4.10 PROCEDURE FOR CLAIMS FOR INJURY, DAMAGE OR LOSS

The general arrangements which apply to the handling of claims and compensation in the event of injury or damage arising from a nuclear emergency are the responsibility of the MOD.

4.11 ARRANGEMENTS FOR OFF-SITE MITIGATION ACTION

The DEPZ is 1.5 kilometres in the downwind sectors of the emergency site. The population in the potentially affected area would be alerted immediately by Police Scotland issuing information statements through all media sources. Subsequent information and advice would also be issued through the media.

If an OSNE occurs and a radiation hazard is detected external to the submarine, it will, in the early stages, be extremely hazardous for personnel to approach close to the submarine. However, intervention activities may be carried out to mitigate the consequences of the radiation emergency or to help endangered persons by HM Naval Base Clyde and will be carried out under strict control measures. The progress of the emergency and the consequent size, if any, of the release to the atmosphere will be determined by radiation monitoring in the vicinity of the emergency site.

It may be some hours before radiation monitoring teams can gather sufficient information to make possible a realistic appreciation of the course of an emergency. It is imperative that there is some pre-determined plan to protect those who may be at risk in the period before definitive monitoring information becomes available.

Public Health England – Centre for Radiation, Chemicals and Environmental Hazards (PHE – CRCE) is responsible for specifying Emergency Reference Levels (ERLs) of averted dose for the initiation of principal countermeasures following an accidental release of
radionuclides and also for providing advice on radiological protection to those with responsibility for responding to an emergency. The PHE-CRCE will also provide advice on long-term measures.

ERLs have been specified for the three emergency countermeasures of Sheltering, the administration of SITs and Evacuation. They are specified as pairs of numbers and indicate the level of dose averted for which it would be reasonable to introduce the countermeasure in different circumstances. For averted doses below the lower Emergency Reference Level it is unlikely that the countermeasures would be warranted. Above the upper level is almost certain that it should be implemented. Countermeasures that could be implemented in the extremely early phase (OSNE) of an emergency include:

a) SHELTERING

Staying indoors with doors and windows shut. Close any ventilation systems.

b) STABLE IODINE TABLETS

If SITs are taken within a few hours of the inhalation of radioactive iodine, the vast excess of stable iodine will substantially reduce the radiation dose to the thyroid gland. The military in conjunction with NHS Highland have made arrangements for the distribution of SITs (SITs Distribution Plan) in the DEPZ.

c) EVACUATION

Protects predominantly against radiation from fission products deposited on the ground.

PHE-CRCE considers that emergency countermeasures should be carried out promptly. Other countermeasures, such as decontamination of buildings, are not so urgent; how quickly they are carried out, if at all, will depend on the exact circumstances of the emergency.
4.12 RECOMMENDED EMERGENCY REFERENCE LEVELS OF DOSE

The MOD requires that Site Specific Intervention Levels are calculated and used for each relevant site. The Site Specific Intervention levels, for Scottish MOD Berths, are based on the lower PHE-CRCE Emergency Reference Level, which are detailed below.

The implementation of emergency countermeasures will be in accordance with the arrangements detailed in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protective Action</th>
<th>Effective dose or organ dose</th>
<th>Averted dose (mSv)a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheltering</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuation</td>
<td>Effective</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Iodine</td>
<td>Thyroidb</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a In recognition of their higher cancer risk, the doses are those potentially averted in young children

b mSv equivalent dose to the thyroid

Source PHE CRCE 049

4.13 PROTECTION OF THE PUBLIC – DEPZ

This refers to an area extending to 1.5km downwind of the emergency site. In the main, the countermeasures required here are less immediate than those to be taken within the 400 metre zone.

It is the policy of NHS Highland that SITs are distributed to the public living in the DEPZ at the declaration of an OSNE. Further instructions from the Director of Public Health Medicine will be promulgated during the course of the emergency. The arrangements to carry this out are in place.

Anyone living or working within the 30° downwind sector will be advised to take shelter by remaining indoors with doors and windows closed, and shut off ventilation systems, until monitoring results have confirmed the extent of any release of radioactive material. A Public Information leaflet ‘What to do in a Radiation Emergency’ has been routinely issued to all households in the DEPZ, it details actions the public should take.

4.14 PROTECTION OF RESPONDING AGENCIES

Responding agencies, other than Scottish Fire and Rescue Service and Scottish Ambulance Service SORT staff, have determined that no member of staff will receive a dose above 1mSv. All staff will therefore be subject to specific procedures as required by Strategic, Tactical and Operational orders.

Scottish Fire and Rescue Service’s limits are determined within UK FRS Generic Risk Assessment 5.5 – Incident involving radiation.

Scottish Ambulance Service dose limits are explained in Section 6.5.
4.15 FOOD SAFETY ADVICE

- Food Standards Agency (FSA) will lead the food safety incident response unless it is mutually agreed that Food Standards Scotland (FSS) take over the lead.
- FSS will attend the Strategic Co-ordination Centre (SCC) in Scotland and link into the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR). FSA will link into COBR.
- FSA will provide radiological modelling which considers the long term effects of ingesting radioactive contamination and technical advice. FSS will provide precautionary food safety advice to businesses and consumers.
- Public Health England (PHE) Centre for Radiation, Chemical and Environmental Hazards (CRCE) will co-ordinate monitoring effort including both sampling and analysis for the assessment of the impact on the human food chain together with other monitoring programmes e.g. for the environment. FSA will co-ordinate the production of radiological food monitoring data/reports and provide to FSS, SEPA and PHE. FSA will provide up to date risk assessment advice to FSS who will work closely with SEPA, PHE, Local Authority Environmental Health/Trading Standards teams, Scottish Government (SG) including the SG Legal Department (SGLD), SG Animal Health and Welfare Division (SG-AHWD), SG Rural Payments and Inspections Division (SG-RPID), Marine Scotland and others to ensure that food controls are put in place.
- FSA and FSS will liaise to input into the appropriate monitoring programme for assessment of the impact on human foodstuffs.
- FSS will provide advice on food contamination issues to the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (SCG), Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Working Group (RWG) within the SCC and responder organisations. FSA will liaise directly with the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).
- FSS may advise Scottish Ministers to issue statutory food restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA), to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area. This is to ensure that contaminated food, which may pose a risk to human health, does not enter the food chain. FSS will liaise with SGLD, SG Agriculture Food and Rural Communities (AFRC) Directorate and Local Authorities to develop the FEPA, which once in place, is enforced by Local Authority enforcement officers or Marine Scotland if the affected area is offshore outwith the Local Authority’s jurisdiction.
- SEPA will provide advice to ensure contaminated foodstuffs are disposed of appropriately in accordance with the best advice available e.g. UK Recovery Handbooks for Radiation Incidents. SEPA is responsible for developing advice for multi-agency responders regarding disposal routes and availability.

Livestock and Animal Health

- In implementing food safety advice and controls, animal welfare issues must also be considered. For example, it may be possible to shelter animals and switch off ventilation to reduce exposure to contamination, but this may not be suitable for prolonged periods. Therefore, for animal welfare reasons it may be appropriate to allow some exposure to radioactivity even where this means the animals will no longer be suitable for food production. This may be a decision for STAC and the SCG within the SCC in conjunction with FSS, SG-AHWD and the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA).
- SG-AHWD will provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of the radiological contamination of livestock.
• SG-AHWD’s policy responsibilities include the health and welfare of livestock, working, companion and zoo animals.

• FSS, following liaison with FSA and SG-AHWD, will consider the need for advisory and statutory controls on livestock movements on the basis of food safety and AHWD will consider the need for similar measures on the basis of welfare. If restrictions are required, FSS will share food risk assessments with SG-AHWD to inform animal welfare decisions.

• SG-AFRC Directorate will co-ordinate communication with farms on the movement of livestock.

• SG-AFRC Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.

• SG-RPID will be available to offer on the ground local agricultural knowledge to FSS as required.

• Local Authority Environmental Health / Trading Standards enforcement teams will provide information regarding locations of food businesses and farms in the vicinity, as required.

• APHA will undertake some of the practical work on SG’s behalf, such as providing local veterinary advice where appropriate.

• The Strategic team and STAC within the SCC, in conjunction with FSS, SG, Local Authorities and APHA will take decisions on matters such as the need for evacuation of animals, the housing of evacuated animals, particularly companion animals, and movement restrictions.

Milk

• For milk consumption, FSA will undertake a risk assessment to decide if restrictions on the supply of milk are required.

• FSS will work with Local Authorities to enforce any restrictions as required and make arrangements for the monitoring and analysis of milk from affected farms.

• SEPA will provide advice to the STAC on the potential disposal of any affected milk. Local responders at STAC may need to agree the options for the disposal of milk and this may need to be escalated to SAGE if disposal cannot be managed locally.

• SG-AFRC Directorate will provide guidance to STAC / farmers on the milking of cattle.

Fish/Shellfish

• FSA will carry out a risk assessment to determine if shellfish harvesting restrictions are required. FSS hold details of the various shellfish harvesting sites around Scotland. SEPA and Marine Scotland can provide advice and information on freshwater fisheries and agriculture.

• FSS will liaise with Marine Scotland should sea fish be affected by the nuclear radiological emergency.

• FSS will liaise with Local Authorities, SEPA and Marine Scotland who hold details of approved fishery establishments.
Water  The Drinking water Quality Regulator for Scotland is responsible for ensuring that water supplies are safe to drink, and will work with stakeholders such as Scottish Water, local authorities and health boards to co-ordinate work to preserve safe public and private drinking water supplies and provide consistent advice to consumers in accordance with the UK Recovery Handbook for Radiation Incidents – Drinking Water Supplies.

Scottish Water will issue advice to domestic customers, licence providers and where appropriate direct to business customers, on the public drinking water supply having agreed the key messages to be communicated with the relevant stakeholders including the local authorities and health boards in the areas affected.

Scottish water will, in conjunction with SEPA, HPS, PHE and other key stakeholders undertake a programme of sampling to monitor for impacts on the public water supply.

4.16 PUBLIC WATER SUPPLIES

Though the potential for impacts on the public water supply are likely to be low, where required, to ensure public safety, and provide re-assurance to the public, sampling of the public water supply may be required. This will be co-ordinated by Scottish Water with the support of relevant agencies including SEPA. A team from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) will also be available to assist in this task.

4.17 PRIVATE WATER SUPPLIES

In some properties, which are not connected to the public water supply, water is drawn from private wells, natural springs or other ground water and, therefore, there may be a risk of this water being contaminated. For this reason a restriction on the use of water from private water supplies in the area may have to be considered. Argyll & Bute Council Environmental Health will carry out sampling but the responsibility for recommending any restrictions lies with the Director of Public Health Medicine.

The DSTL team will analyse and report on samples as to whether private water supplies are safe to drink. When water restrictions are in place, Scottish Water and Argyll and Bute Council will jointly review temporary alternative water supplies, these will be provided by Scottish Water. Lifting of restrictions will be after agreement of the Director of Public Health Medicine. Further information as above.

4.18 EVACUATION / RELOCATION

It is unlikely that the immediate evacuation/relocation of members of the civilian population will become necessary. However, the civil authorities, acting on advice from the multi-agency STAC at the COSC consider it desirable; the police will put evacuation procedures into operation.

It is anticipated that in such extreme circumstances the period of evacuation might be prolonged, therefore, the local authority will make arrangements for Emergency Centres to be opened. School children evacuated during school hours will be cared for by the local authority until released into the care of a parent/guardian.

It may also be necessary in the interests of public safety to restrict access to contaminated areas. All necessary actions will be co-ordinated by Police Scotland, MOD and the Local Authority.

It has been recognised that, in the event of a radiation emergency, some members of the public will self-evacuate immediately ignoring the official advice to shelter. If possible, those people will be catered for in designated emergency centres.

There may be a need to evacuate those resident at the Base temporarily to an Emergency Centre. Argyll and Bute Council will work with the MOD in the identification and opening of a suitable premises.
4.19 FURTHER DOWNWIND PRECAUTIONS

Milk Supplies – see 4.15 above

The Food Standards Agency will carry out risk assessment to define the precise affected area. Food Standards Scotland will advise of necessary restrictions after consultation with the Naval Authorities, the representatives of the Scottish Government and the NHS Board.

The Local Authority will be informed of the area affected in order to enable it to give advice on behalf of Food Standards Scotland on matters affecting the consumption of foodstuffs produced in the area. The Local Authority is responsible for maintaining an up-to-date list of all dairy farms within 10km of the authorised nuclear submarine berths in the Clyde area.

4.20 EXTENDING THE AREA FOR COUNTERMEASURES

The LRP Strategic will continually assess the requirements for all countermeasures. This may require consideration of an extension of the area to ensure maximum protection and reassurance.

4.21 BASIS FOR LIFTING (REMOVING) COUNTERMEASURES

Countermeasures will not be lifted until the Strategic LRP, advised by specialist agencies such as PHE-CRCE, are convinced that the risk to the public is less than if the countermeasures were to remain in force.
SECTION 5 - ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF KEY AGENCIES

5.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ROYAL NAVY)

An OSNE will be declared by the MOD Co-ordinating Authority following detailed communications with the ICCC (Faslane) / DEHQ (Coulport) and Commanding Officer of the emergency submarine.

An MOD Incident Commander will be responsible for the On-Site response at Faslane, Coulport and Loch Goil.

The MOD, through the HM Naval Base Commander Clyde, will provide the COSC for the multi-agency Strategic Headquarters for co-ordination of the Off-Site response.

The MOD, through the HM Naval Base Commander Clyde, will provide a comprehensive support team to the COSC to provide advice and guidance on radiation safety requirements, countermeasures, technical issues and logistic support to all response support activities.

The MOD, through the HM Naval Base Commander Clyde, will provide a liaison officer to attend at the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR) in Edinburgh.

The Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (NEMT) Headquarters is at the COSC and is able to carry out necessary radiation monitoring procedures, determining the extent of any hazard arising from an abnormal release of radioactivity which may occur in a nuclear reactor emergency.

All nuclear radiation monitoring activities, at all MOD sites, are controlled by the Monitoring Controllers on behalf of the Naval Base Commander Clyde. The NEMT will carry out all procedures in liaison and conjunction with other supporting monitoring forces.

The SOG HPA will provide Health Physics advice until the arrival of the PHE-CRCE at the COSC. On the arrival of the PHE-CRCE, the Health Physics Advisor will act as a specialist conduit for the information to PHE-CRCE. It will be the responsibility of the PHE-CRCE to formulate and provide radiation protection advice to the Strategic, Tactical, STAC and Media Groups.

If technology permits, PHE can provide advice remotely by dialling into the STAC, either before the COSC is established or even once established, if appropriate.

This Off-Site Emergency Plan will be implemented and managed in conjunction with the MOD’s Operators Emergency Plan (On-Site Plan) for the emergency site. This is implemented via the on-site Command Team in the ICCC (Faslane) or DEHQ (Coulport).

5.2 POLICE SCOTLAND

First Emergency Services at Scene:

- M - Major incident
- E - Exact location
- T - Type of incident
- H - Hazards
- A - Access to scene
- N - Number and severity of casualties
- E - Emergency Services on site & required
- Start a log
- Provide an initial update to control using METHANE above.
Establish Forward Control Point (FCP)/Rendezvous Point (RVP) and consider Incident Control Point (ICP).
Establish access/egress and outer/inner cordons.
Consider the declaration of Major Incident.
Establish communications and deployment of MI Box if required
Ensure supervisory attendance, appoint Police Incident Officer (PIO), on PIO tabard and coordinate response in liaison with other agency incident officers.
Ensure Duty Officer Service Overview is aware.
Ensure the Duty Divisional Senior Officer(s) is/are aware.
Ensure Emergency Planning are aware/ Consider requesting an EPA.

During the emergency phase of an incident the Police will co-ordinate the emergency response, **chair the LRP STRATEGIC during the emergency phase** and implement measures to protect the public. The role of the police includes:

a) The saving of life in conjunction with the other emergency services. This is normally achieved through co-ordinating the emergency response;

b) The call out and co-ordination of the emergency services and other organisations during the emergency phase of the incident. Note the Local Authority will co-ordinate the response by the voluntary sector;

c) In conjunction with support from other agencies, protection and preservation of the scene;

d) In conjunction with other agencies, investigation of the incident. Note where it is quickly established that the locus is not a crime scene, the leading role for the investigation may be taken by another investigative agency such as the Health and Safety Executive;

e) In conjunction with support from other agencies, collation and dissemination of casualty information;

f) In conjunction with support from other agencies, identification of casualties and co-ordination of the management of casualties including seizing the remains of the deceased;

g) Representing / acting on behalf of the Procurator Fiscal;

h) The co-ordination of the response by the media – in accordance with the WoSRRP - Public Communications Plan;

i) The management of public information during the emergency phase;

j) The co-ordination and implementation of public safety measures, in consultation with other agencies, deciding on when or if, to evacuate the population;

k) To assist other agencies in the restoration of normality.

Mutual Aid arrangements are well established within Police Scotland and are utilised regularly as part of normal working arrangements.
5.3 ARgyll AND Bute Council

It is likely that many Council services will become involved in an OSNE. The Chief Executive has overall responsibility for the co-ordination of responding organisations during the recovery phase of the incident.

In responding to an incident the responsibilities of Argyll and Bute Council may be summarised as follows:-

a) Civil Contingencies team will ensure SMT, Heads of Service, Communications Team and Recovery Working Group Chair are informed of the incident.

b) If required, Tactical, Strategic and Comms lead and any other officers as deemed necessary (support staff) to report to the COSC.

c) Civil Contingencies team will alert local managers and ask those appropriate to report to a suitable meeting place.

d) Civil Contingencies Team will ensure suitable communications are set up between COSC and Council Headquarters at Kilmory, Lochgilphead.

e) Civil Contingencies representative will initially act as liaison officer for the Council with the emergency services;

f) Arrange for the set-up and continual updating of an electronic chronological log.

g) Identify, open and manage in conjunction with the HSCP emergency support centres for local residents, if required;

h) The identification and opening of emergency centres for Naval Base personnel (resident officers).

i) Alert and/or call out voluntary agencies for support at emergency centre(s);

j) Assist in providing information to the public affected by the emergency through the multi-agency media and public communications group;

k) The identification of suitable premises to set-up and support Radiation Monitoring Unit(s) - (RMU) in conjunction with NHS Highland, for local residents.

l) Assessing the risks to public health and supporting the STAC and other agencies in terms of regulation and health protection, including the assessment of the risks to private waters supplies;

m) The establishment of the multi-agency Recovery Working Group (Chair) and with other agencies the development of a recovery strategy.

If necessary local managers will be supported by those from other areas of the Council.
5.4 SCOTTISH FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE

Responding to emergencies is a core function of the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS)


These include firefighting, the saving of life, whether in fire, transport and traffic incidents or any other emergency, protection of property and mitigating damage to property and the environment.

The SFRS also has the power to deal with other eventualities such as flooding, incidents involving hazardous materials, including incidents involving radiation, safeguarding the environment and the consequences of terrorist incidents.

The SFRS is responsible for safety management in and around areas of SFRS operations. The SFRS will provide information and advice on hazards and associated risks to other agencies involved in an emergency.

The SFRS is capable of rapidly mobilising trained personnel and a broad range of specialist appliances and rescue equipment in addition. These capabilities include – urban search and rescue, detection, identification and monitoring of hazardous substances, decontamination of people, heavy rescue equipment, rope and water rescue teams, including boat teams.

In an emergency, SFRS resources may be utilised as directed by the Incident Commander (Fire) to assist other agencies in discharging their respective roles.

Key to the success of any emergency and in compliance with the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, it will be the duty of Scottish Fire and Rescue Service to liaise with all Category 1 and 2 responders at an emergency.

The SFRS role may involve a combination of the following aspects:-

a) The rescue of trapped casualties

b) Prevent further escalation of the incident by tackling fires, dealing with hazardous substances and other hazardous situations

c) Information gathering and hazard assessment to give advice to Police and enable them to advise the public to evacuate or shelter

d) Liaison with the Police regarding the provision of an inner cordon around the immediate incident to enable the Incident Fire Commander to exercise control

e) To advise and assist where appropriate in the safety of all emergency personnel involved in rescue work

f) Consideration of the effect the incident may have on the environment and the action to be taken to minimise this

g) Liaison with the Medical or Ambulance Incident Officer on the priority rescues and evacuation of casualties

h) Participation in investigations as appropriate and preparing reports and evidence for enquiries

i) Standby during non-emergency recovery phase to ensure continued safety at the incident location
5.5 SCOTTISH AMBULANCE SERVICE

- Save life and provide immediate care for patients at the scene of the incident and in transit to hospital;
- Alert hospital services and other relevant NHS agencies;
- Manage clinical decontamination for people affected by hazardous substances, prior to their evacuation from the scene;
- Evacuate, where practicable, the injured from the scene in order of medical priority;
- Arrange and secure the most appropriate transport for the injured to the receiving hospital(s);
- Supply patient care equipment to the scene of a major incident;
- Transport essential medical staff and their equipment to the scene;
- Alert the British Red Cross and St. Andrew's Ambulance Association and co-ordinate their work in support of the SAS
- Provide and maintain communications equipment for key medical staff and voluntary organisations at the scene.
- Restore the service to normality*

*includes a requirement to maintain the continuity of mission critical activities.

NOTE

Scottish Ambulance Service officers working within the DEPZ or in potentially hazardous areas on the periphery of the DEPZ will be afforded maximum protective measures and safety for all duties. Where appropriate this will include the issue of PITs and relevant Respiratory Protective Equipment from the COSC. Details on SAS dose limits can be found in Section 6.5
5.6 HM COASTGUARD (MCGA)

MCGA Main activities/responsibilities -

The MCGA facilitates the safety of shipping and seafarers, saves lives and protects the maritime environment. Agency provides a 24-hour maritime search and rescue service; enforces ship safety; prevents pollution; promotes seafarer health; safety and welfare standards by survey and inspection; registers and certifies ships and seafarers; and manages pollution prevention and response. The Agency has responsibility for the implementation of the technical aspects of relevant international maritime conventions.

HM Coastguard has a statutory duty under the Coastguard Act 1925, and Statutory Instrument, by order of the Secretary of State for Transport, laid before Parliament on 9 March 1992, for the initiation and co-ordination of all Civil Maritime Search and Rescue within the United Kingdom Search and Rescue Region (UKSRR), this includes the mobilisation, organisation and tasking of adequate resources to respond to persons either in distress at sea, or to persons at risk of injury or death on the cliffs or shoreline of the UK.

HM Coastguard has the responsibility of broadcasting Marine Safety Information, including Navigation Warnings, Weather, Subfacts and Gunfacts information on VHF and MF radio.

HM Coastguard is normally the first point of contact for maritime pollution incidents, and will alert the MCA’s Counter-Pollution and Salvage Branch of all incidents reported.

HM Coastguard as a Category 1 responder will wherever possible and within our competencies and capabilities support requests from other responders for assistance for non-maritime and coastal incidents.
5.7 **NHS HIGHLAND**

Lead Health Board - NHS Highland
Nominated Support - NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde
Mutual Aid - NHS Ayrshire & Arran

The NHS emergency response to radiation incidents is provided by the Scottish Ambulance Service with support available from Site Medical Teams and Medical Incident Officers. Primary Care and Acute services support to a radiation incident is co-ordinated by the Health Board.

When responding to an incident the NHS core responsibilities may be defined as follows:

a) Chair the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell – STAC;

b) Treatment and care of casualties, including the identification through monitoring of anyone, injured or not, contaminated with radioactive material; *(see Section 5.12(a) for further details on Radiation Monitoring)*

c) Advice to the emergency services, local and other authorities, the public and the media about effects of a radiation incident on human health, and of counter measures to those effects;

d) Control arrangements for the administration of SITs;

e) Notification to and keeping informed, Scottish Government – Health Department and other NHS Health Board Areas in the event of an emergency NHS Greater Glasgow providing Radiation Protection Advisor and having the receiving hospitals for radiation casualties;

f) Initiation of measures to assess longer term health effects including confirmation of calculated assessments of population exposure by sample validation monitoring, and by monitoring individuals who have reason to suppose they have been exposed to higher than average levels of contamination;

Access the appropriate specialist clinical and radiation protection expertise and advice when required.

5.8 **HEALTH AND SOCIAL CARE PARTNERSHIP (HSPC)**

In responding to an incident at Faslane, NHS Highland (through the Argyll and Bute Health and Social Care Partnership where appropriate) and through a Memorandum of Understanding between NHS Highland and NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde will provide the following –

- The care of casualties and those affected by the incident
- The provision of public health advice to those managing the response
- The provision of a Medical Incident Officer and Site Medical Team if and when required
- The provision of an On-call Public Health Consultant
- The provision of psychological support to victims and those responding to the incident
5.9 THE SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY

SEPA is responsible for environmental protection in Scotland and adopts an integrated approach to the protection and enhancement of water, air and land and associated natural resources. SEPA is responsible for the administration and enforcement of the Environmental Authorisations (Scotland) Regulations 2018 (EASR). Under EASR SEPA is responsible for the authorisation of radioactive waste on and from the site and maintains an independent monitoring regime for radioactivity in food and the environment around the site.

During an emergency SEPA may make environmental measurements in support of its function and may contribute any environmental measurement capability to other organisations involved. SEPA will, if requested, provide advice to government on sampling and measurement of radioactive contamination in the environment, potable and surface waters, and the food chain. SEPA will advise on and authorise the management of any radioactive waste arising as a result of an incident. SEPA will also advise on any off site decontamination undertaken in the remediation phase. SEPA will ensure that information passed from the HSCC/SCG/STAC to the SEPA Radioactive Substances Technical Hub is entered on the RIMNET system.

Agreed Actions

**Site Incident**

1. Investigate and take appropriate action with respect to enforcement duties.

**Off-site Nuclear Emergency**

In responding to the incident SEPA will:-

1. Provide appropriate representatives, as required, to meet local coordination arrangements.
2. Set up and staff SEPA Radioactive Substances Technical Hub.
3. Provide advice on the environmental impact of a radiological incident to relevant organisations.
4. Provide information on the environmental effects of the incident where appropriate.
5. Maintain operational links with appropriate organisations to ensure an integrated response to the incident
6. Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste and, if appropriate, authorise such disposals
7. Determine if a breach of site authorisation has occurred and gather relevant information if necessary
SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT

For a radiation emergency at a defence site in Scotland, the MOD is the Lead Government Department, however, the Scottish Government will lead on public protection, consequence management and recovery issues. Both MOD and Scottish Government will work closely together.

The Scottish Government Resilience Division will lead the activation of its emergency arrangement’s through SGoRR. The role of SGoRR will vary depending on the nature of the emergency, in broad terms, it will:

- Brief Scottish Ministers
- Act as the focal point for communication between Scottish Government and the responder agencies
- Ensure effective liaison with UK Government Departments including MOD and COBR
- Co-ordinate and support the activity of SG Directorates
- Consider the need for emergency regulations to be requested
- Collate and maintain a strategic picture of the emergency response, with a particular focus on consequence management issues.
- Ensure effective communication between local, Scottish and UK levels, including the co-ordination of reports on the response and recovery effort
- Support the response and recovery efforts as appropriate
- Provide the focal point on public health and NHS resilience issues at a national level
- Provide advice and support activity to minimise the impact of radiation on animal health and welfare and plant health

Section 4.15 provides a summary of the food safety, livestock/animal health, milk, fish/shellfish and water responsibilities in the event of a nuclear radiological emergency in Scotland.

SGoRR will schedule officials and ministerial meetings during the response and recovery phases. Typically, SGoRR will include participants from the main affected Scottish Government Directorates including the Resilience Essential Services and Communities Unit, and representatives of relevant agencies.

When a Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) is activated it will provide advice to, and interact with SGoRR as well as the STAC.

West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership - WoSRRP

Resilience Co-ordinators from the West of Scotland Regional Resilience Partnership will provide support for the LRP groups and facilitate communication with Scottish Government.

SGoRR will facilitate liaison with the Scotland Office (London) and Ministry of Defence, collect and co-ordinate briefings for Ministers and provide advice on Ministerial interests.
5.11 FOOD STANDARDS SCOTLAND

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is responsible for food safety in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Food Standards Scotland (FSS), which was established on 1 April 2015, is responsible for food safety in Scotland. FSS’s role is to help protect the public from risks to health which may arise through the consumption of food.

In the event of a radiological emergency in the UK (including those in or affecting Scotland) the food safety incident response will be led by the FSA unless it is mutually agreed that FSS will take over the lead. FSS will provide the on-site response in Scotland. FSA and FSS will collaborate closely, maintain compatible incident management plans and ensure effective communication throughout the emergency.

In the event of an emergency the FSS will lead the Scottish Government’s response on food safety issues, assess the impact of the emergency on the food chain and implement any necessary countermeasures.

Specific responsibilities are:

- To liaise with relevant partners to determine the level of any contamination in the food chain
- To take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain
- To liaise with relevant partners, as necessary, to implement restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area.
- To provide support, advice, information and guidance to local authorities, businesses and the public on the implications for food.
- To provide support and advice to the Scottish Government and partners dealing with the emergency.
- To ensure that subsequent recovery arrangements take account of food safety issues.
5.12 PUBLIC HEALTH ENGLAND

Centre for radiation, chemical and environmental hazards (PHE – CRCE)

PHE-CRCE is responsible for the provision of expert advice and information relating to the radiological protection aspects of an emergency to government and any strategic group set up to manage the response. PHE publishes guidance on Emergency Reference Levels (ERL’s) to protect the public. This guidance is accepted as a basis for the current nuclear emergency arrangements.

Radiation Monitoring Teams and Monitoring Co-ordination

A fundamental component of the PHE-CRCE radiation emergency response plan is maintenance of capability to deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and undertaking measurements of radioactivity on or in people. Teams can be deployed from Chilton, Leeds and Glasgow. Their deployment and tasking is controlled by the Monitoring Control Team Leader based in the Chilton Emergency Centre who reports directly to the PHE-CRCE Operations Director.

In addition to deployment and management of CRCE monitoring teams, PHE also has a national monitoring co-ordination role during radiation emergencies, which is managed by CRCE. PHE will co-ordinate the monitoring resources made available to it in the event of an emergency and prepare a monitoring strategy for approval by the Strategic Co-ordinating Group (LRP - Strategic). This responsibility covers the responsibility for monitoring people and the environment. It does not change or re-allocate any existing responsibilities that organisations might hold with regards to radiation monitoring. PHE has no power to commandeer resources and PHE would not expect to take direct tactical control of any resources made available.

Each organisation is responsible for ensuring that staff are properly trained, and its resources are adequately maintained. Operational responsibility would be retained at each monitoring organisation’s emergency centre. PHE-CRCE will periodically provide organisations with what information it has as the incident develops, this should include:-

- A summary of the incident situation;
- PHE-CRCE local rules for its own monitoring teams being deployed;
- PHE-CRCE radiological risk assessment for its own monitoring teams being deployed.

Organisation’s monitoring teams will however need to:-

- Be self-sufficient in respect of their own accommodation, transport, meals, communications, etc;
- Have appropriate health physics skills to competently carry out the agreed monitoring tasks;
- Work under the supervision of their own management structures, and be self-sufficient in terms of PPE (including RPE where appropriate).
5.12(a) Radiation Monitoring Unit(s) (RMU's)

NHS Boards have the responsibility for initiating the implementation of emergency personal monitoring in the event of a radiation incident with support from Public Health England (PHE).

Suitable premises/sites can/will be identified by the Local Authority.

In the event of a radiation emergency, there may be a requirement to establish a Radiation Monitoring Unit (RMU). The purpose of an RMU is to provide information on levels of radioactive contamination on or in people, by facilitating individual monitoring (also known as personal monitoring or people monitoring). This information will be used to inform decisions on some of the measures that could significantly reduce dose to individuals, and to advise and inform affected members of the public.

An important function of the RMU is to ensure that NHS Emergency Departments do not become overwhelmed by members of the public seeking people monitoring. Monitoring requests coming from ‘self-presenters’ should be re-directed to the RMUs, while hospitals should focus on injured people with potential contamination.

People radiological/nuclear monitoring is a process that begins soon after a radiation incident is reported and continues until all potentially affected people have been monitored. It must be noted that there may be situations where it is not feasible to monitor ALL potentially affected people and it may be both necessary and appropriate to monitor sample of the population. Those receiving monitoring will be largely ‘self-presenters’ who have been informed of this service by staff managing the incident via the media but may include members of the public who have been evacuated from an at risk area.

Scottish Ambulance Service and Scottish Fire and Rescue Service have decontamination capabilities to decontaminate members of the public most affected by the incident, therefore reducing significantly the effective dose they would have taken otherwise. **Time is key for contaminated people, and delaying the establishment of the RMU or redirecting people to a different location could result in an increased hazard.**

The objective of a radiation monitoring unit –

- Identify those who are externally contaminated at a level which could result in significant health effects, and who therefore require urgent decontamination
- Identify those who are externally contaminated at lower levels but for whom decontamination is still justified
- Identify those who are internally contaminated at a level which could result in significant health effects, and who require medical assessment
- Identify those who should be considered for treatment to reduce internal contamination levels
- Prioritise people for later measurements or assessments of internal contamination that cannot be carried out at the RMU
- Provide information to individuals on their internal radiation dose, with the aim of providing reassurance where appropriate.
- Supply information on radiation dose received by members of the public for incident assessment purposes.
- Reassure those people who are not contaminated.

**The Radiation Monitoring Unit does not provide environmental monitoring and would not normally be used to monitor emergency service staff as this is managed separately.**
It is recognised that a radiation monitoring unit should be operational within a 6 hours’ time frame of an incident. Whilst every effort would be made to support this, it has been identified that medical physicist employed by NHS Boards may be off-duty. PHE will endeavour to deploy staff within the 6 hour timeframe to support the monitoring of persons, but this cannot be guaranteed. However, PHE have committed to Department of Health that a full deployment to an RMU can be achieved within 24hrs of notification.

The likelihood of a radiological incident from an accidental release is low, due to the level of safety measures in place, due to the legislative requirements. However the impact of a release from a public concern point of view would be significant, as people would be worried about radioactive exposure, even if there was no actual risk of them being exposed or contaminated.

Argyll and Bute Council are currently working on the availability of suitable sites/premises for Radiation Monitoring Units – RMUs.

More detail will be inserted into the next update of this Plan.

5.13 OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR)

The ONR is responsible for regulating nuclear safety on nuclear licensed sites and the requirements of REPPIR on MOD nuclear authorised sites. In the event of a nuclear emergency, ONR is responsible for monitoring the activities of the operators and advising central government and devolved administrations.

Using its statutory powers, ONR will inspect and review the activities of the operator to ensure that they are taking all reasonable steps both to restore the plant to a safe state and to minimise the risk to the general public.
5.14 SCOTTISH WATER

Scottish Water has responsibility for establishing procedures for protecting and decontaminating water treatment facilities, related infrastructure and the public water supply, maintaining sewerage treatment facilities, related infrastructure and protecting the aquatic environment. Scottish Water must be contacted immediately there is any indication of / potential for contamination to any raw water source or sewerage system, or potential for / actual contamination of or damage to Scottish Water’s water and wastewater infrastructure.

In responding to an off-site nuclear incident impacting those sites covered in this plan, Scottish Water’s responsibilities are summarised below.

With the respect to the public water supply, Scottish Water will;

a. Ensure that any immediate risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the public water system are adequately controlled.
b. Assess the risk of contamination to the public water supply (including raw water sources)
c. Assess the risk / impact of damage to the water network and related infrastructure.
d. Arrange and co-ordinate sampling and analysis of public water supplies (including raw water sources) as appropriate and where relevant, in conjunction with SEPA.
e. Collate information on the level and nature of any contamination of public water supplies (including raw water sources).
f. Assess the risk to the public health from any impacted / contaminated public water supplies, as per the multi-agency Scottish Waterborne Hazard Plan (SWHP).
g. Assess the risks to staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any damage to and / or contamination of the water infrastructure.
h. Take measures to minimise the risk to public health from contaminated public water supplies.
i. In coordination and where appropriate, agreement with other stakeholders, take the required measures to minimise risks to Scottish Water staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the public water infrastructure;
j. Provide advice to customers and Licenced Service Providers (LRPs) on public water supplies in accordance with the Public Health Guidelines issued.
k. Where there is a disruption to the public water supply, Scottish Water will, with the support of Police Scotland and other relevant stakeholders arrange for the provision of alternative supplies of drinking water.
l. In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS and other stakeholders, take the required measures to decontaminate and / or recover contaminated public water infrastructure.
SEWERAGE (WASTEWATER) NETWORK

a) Ensure that any immediate risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors working on the sewerage system are adequately controlled.

b) Assess the risk of contamination to the wastewater network and related infrastructure.

c) Assess the risk / impact of damage to the wastewater network and related infrastructure.

d) Arrange and coordinate sampling and analysis of process, point discharges, sludge and other relevant environmental samples in conjunction with SEPA and other stakeholders.

e) Collate information on the level and nature of the contamination of the wastewater infrastructure.

f) Assess the risks to Scottish Water staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any damage to and / or contamination of the wastewater network and related infrastructure.

g) In coordination and where appropriate, agreement with SEPA and other stakeholders, take the required measures to minimise risks to the wastewater infrastructure staff, contractors, the public and other third parties including the environment of any contamination of the wastewater network and related infrastructure.

h) In consultation and agreement with SEPA, HPS, PHE and other stakeholders take the required measures to decontaminate and / or recover contaminated wastewater network and related infrastructure.

5.15 NETWORK RAIL

The railway in the vicinity of HM Naval Base Clyde is referred to as the West Highland Line, running from Glasgow via Helensburgh Upper Station to Arrochar and beyond including London and Fort William. It is mainly used for passenger trains, with the nightly sleeper service from Fort William and freight trains serving the route. Additionally, in the summer months, this is the route of several private steam charter services.

In the event of an OSNE being declared, and if felt necessary, consideration should be given to early notification to Network Rail so that steps can be taken to reduce the potential risk posed to rail passengers entering the affected area.

Network Rail are the owners and operators of the railway infrastructure in the UK. All train operations are controlled by them although services are provided by Train Operating Companies (TOC’s) and Freight Operating Companies (FOC’s).

It is Network Rail who will manage any incident on or near the railway on behalf of the railway industry and it is therefore important that contact be made with them in the first instance. There is an established protocol in place with the emergency services and it will normally be them who make contact during emergencies.

In Scotland, Network Rail is controlled from the Network Rail Infrastructure Control in Glasgow and it is from here that any emergency response will be initiated and coordinated. On-call staff are strategically located throughout the area, available to respond to incidents around the clock.
SECTION 6 - ACTIONS OF KEY AGENCIES

6.1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (ROYAL NAVY)

This section summarises the actions to be taken by the various MOD Departments in accordance with the Operator's On-site Emergency Plan.

Submarine Commanding Officer

The Submarine Commanding Officer is to:

a) Alert the following HM Naval Base Clyde of the nuclear emergency:
   - DNBO in the ICCC at Faslane (for Faslane or Loch Goil emergency); Or
   - Duty Tech Adviser in the DEHQ at Coulport (for Coulport emergency).

b) Establish and maintain communication with the ICCC (Faslane) or DEHQ (Coulport). Provide a technical and safety brief on the emergency as it is developing;

c) Carry out radiological monitoring procedures on board and report all results to the ICCC (Faslane) or DEHQ (Coulport);

d) Evacuate non-essential personnel from the submarine in accordance with Submarine Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) to the Warrant Officers and Senior Rates Mess within HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane) or HM Naval Base Clyde (Coulport);

e) If and when required, evacuate all remaining essential personnel from the submarine to the EZRC for radiation contamination monitoring and assessment. In this situation, and dependent on the prevailing radiation hazard, attempt to ensure that the submarine is left in a safe and secure state from a containment, seamanship and navigation perspective;

f) Ensure Key submarine personnel are given priority for processing through the EZRC for onward transfer to the ICCC (Faslane) or DEHQ (Coulport) for debriefing;

g) Authorise and manage any necessary REPPIR Intervention activities carried out by Ship’s Staff.

Naval Base Commander, Clyde

DNBO

a) The on-site incident commander is to validate and authorise declaration of an OSNE by the MOD Co-ordinating Authority in the COSC;

b) initiate the cascade callout of Police Scotland and other external civil authorities;

c) to initiate the cascade callout of NERO post holders and MOD authorities, including Defence Nuclear Safety Regulator (DNSR) and ONR;

d) to establish and maintain communications with the emergency submarine throughout the emergency response until full evacuation of the submarine is necessary.

e) The on-site incident commander is to command the NERO response from the ICCC (Faslane) or DEHQ (Coulport) respectively. This will include the muster and off-site dispersal of base non-essential personnel and the authorisation and management of all REPPIR Intervention activities required to mitigate the consequences of the OSNE, or to recover casualties.

f) MCA to represent the MOD at the Strategic LRP meetings.
MOD Co-ordinating Authority

a) The MCA is to establish the MOD elements of the COSC and Media Briefing Centre;

b) The MCA is to source a suitable Subject matter Expert to attend SGoRR as a liaison Officer as required.

c) The MOD Co-ordinating Authority is to establish and maintain communications with the following:
   - On-site incident commander
   - Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation in MOD Main Building London and all other associated authorities;
   - Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team;
   - To represent the MOD at the strategic meetings (SCG/LRP – Strategic)
   - MOD Liaison Officer within the SGoRR in Edinburgh.

d) The MOD Co-ordinating Authority delegates the alerting, reception, briefing and onward deployment of all relevant MOD response forces from the COSC. Note not all response forces will deploy direct from HM Naval Base Clyde;

e) In coordination with Police Scotland the MOD Co-ordinating Authority will make arrangements to notify the next of kin of any deceased military personnel.

Nuclear Emergency Monitoring Team (COSC)

a) The NEMT is to implement radiation monitoring procedures in accordance with current MOD Directives and NEMT Operating Instructions;

b) The NEMT is to process all survey and sampling data in a timely manner and report all results immediately to all MOD authorities and the Strategic Headquarters;

c) The NEMT is to co-ordinate the reception and management of incoming radiation monitoring support assets.

Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation – Ministry of Defence Headquarters London

The Defence Nuclear Emergency Organisation is to:

a) Co-ordinate the overall response of all MOD authorities;

b) Record and co-ordinate all reports and data from the emergency site;

c) Prepare and co-ordinate briefings to all government departments;

d) Prepare and provide reports for the Nuclear Emergency Information Advisory Group;

e) Prepare and provide material for public and media information and briefings;

d) Liaise with MOD - SGoRR representative.
Ministry of Defence representative at Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR)

a) An MCA nominated representative from HM Naval Base Clyde (Faslane), will travel to SGoRR, Edinburgh, to be the liaison between Scottish Executive and MOD Departments;

b) The MCA nominated representative will be a Royal Navy Commander or civilian equivalent;

c) The Assistant MOD Co-ordinating Authority will be in possession of a MOD NERIMS laptop computer.

6.2 POLICE SCOTLAND

DUTY OFFICER SERVICE OVERVIEW

a) Consider resource request to be made to Events Planning West for mutual aid.

b) Activate the cascade call out list as follows:

CASCADE CALL OUT LIST

- Scottish Fire and Rescue Service;
- Scottish Ambulance Service;
- Argyll and Bute Council;
- NHS Highland;
- Scottish Government – Duty Officer
- Scottish Environment Protection Agency - SEPA;
- Public Health England – PHE - CRCE
- Food Standards Agency;
- Animal and Plant Health Agency

Call out of the following will depend on the extent of the incident -

- Met Office
- HM Coastguard (MCA);
- Scottish Water;
- Network Rail (necessary to stop trains asap)
- British Telecom;

c) Update the incident on Command and Control System;

d) Notify duty Assistant Chief Constable to deploy to the COSC as Strategic Commander along with Staff Officer;

Inform ACC of requirement to release Emergency Broadcast Public Warning - pro forma form is part of the off-site Emergency Plan – Page 93

e) Notify on-call Emergency Procedures Adviser to deploy to the COSC;
f) Notify Corporate Communications to deploy to the COSC; Liaise with ACC regarding the requirement to release Emergency Broadcast Public Warning – pro forma form is part of the off-site Emergency Plan – Page 93

g) Notify HOLMES Manager;

h) Notify Radio Communications and IT Section;

i) Call out two Strategic Minute Takers to attend at the COSC;

j) Arrange for Liaison Officer to go to MOD in London;

k) Notify on-call cadre. Senior Management to include CI, Superintendent

AREA CONTROL ROOM

a) Notify on duty Inspector (PIO)

b) Notify the Divisional Commander or designated representative to deploy to COSC, Rhu in the role of Police Tactical Commander and to establish an incident control post;

c) Deploy a staff officer and other appropriate officers to the COSC, Rhu as per pre-identified COSC deployment on STORM to attend the COSC, support the PIO and establish Incident Control Post Functions.

d) Notify the Area Commander or nominated representative to deploy to the designated Police Forward Control Point as Police Incident Officer and to establish an operational level of management.
6.3 ARGYLL AND BUTE COUNCIL

On receipt of notification by Police Scotland Duty Officer Service Overview of an incident at HM Naval Base Clyde:

**The Civil Contingencies Manager / Officer or other authorised officer will:-**

a) Alert the Chief Executive, Executive Directors, Heads of Service and Communications Manager/Team.
b) Alert local managers
c) If CE required at the COSC - ensure support for the LRP Strategic.
d) Provide standing agenda for Recovery phase;
e) Manage, or appoint an appropriate officer to manage the Council Cell at the COSC;
f) Inform Chief Officer who will Chair Recovery Working Group;
g) Alert neighbouring Councils Civil Contingencies Units.
h) Ensure Support officers are provided to assist the running of the council cell
i) Assign administrative tasks within the cell to appropriate persons
j) Provide a list of emergency support centres nearby and consult with HSCP

**The Civil Contingencies Officer will:-**

a) Start a log of events, or appoint an officer to do this; also
b) Ensure the electronic logging is set-up and managed
c) Assist in the cascade alert to local area managers
d) Ensure appropriate officers at Council HQ are kept informed

**The Chief Executive will:-**

a) Ensure the Council Leader, Chair of Local Committee and local elected members for the area are informed;
b) If necessary, attend at the COSC or nominate an Executive Director to attend;
c) Inform the Strategic Management Team (if not already informed) and appoint a Tactical Director to attend at the COSC;
d) Prepare to take over the co-ordination role from the Chief Constable when the emergency phase is concluded.
e) Ensure that the Heads of Education initiate the relocation of Garelochhead Primary School and nursery as detailed within Critical Activity Recovery Plan.

**The Chief Officer for the Recovery Working Group will:-**

a) Attend at the COSC/other premises – set-up/Chair the Recovery Working Group;
b) Appoint an Environmental Health Officer to attend STAC;
c) Provide a minute taker for the Recovery Working Group.
The Communications Manager will:

a) Attend at the COSC;
b) Assist Police Scotland Public Communications Manager in the provision of information to the media;
c) In conjunction with Police Scotland Communications Manager and the multi-agency information cell, co-ordinate the information to the public;
d) Prepare to assume the lead in the co-ordination of information to the public in the recovery phase;
e) Arrange with his/her team to utilise the Council website and all other means of information sharing for the dissemination of information.

Lead officer for the Area Local Emergency Response Team will:

a) Lead the ALERT response remote from the COSC or if required report to the COSC.
b) Co-ordinate the Operational response;
c) Inform staff in the Bute and Cowal area – for back up resources (if required)

Area Service Manager(s) Social Work (Health & Social Care Partnership)

a) Report to the ALERT – COSC if required
b) Depending on circumstances, and in conjunction with other services, and only if necessary plan for the opening of an emergency centre(s) for the care of displaced persons;
c) Identify persons at risk (vulnerable clients) in the affected area to establish care needs;
d) Ensure there is sufficient staff resources to deal with the situation.
6.4 SCOTTISH FIRE AND RESCUE SERVICE

On receipt of a message alerting the Scottish Fire and Rescue Service (SFRS) to an incident at HM Naval Base, Clyde, SFRS Operations Control will mobilise the following pre-determined attendance to a specific rendezvous point where they will await further request from Naval Authorities to attend incident.

- HM Naval Base, Clyde – 4 Pumps, DIM Unit, First Call Officer and inform the SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser
- Operational berths – 2 Pumps, DIM Unit, First Call Officer and inform the SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser
- All relevant information will be conveyed to mobiles responding and notified officers

This attendance may be enhanced according to the particulars of the specific incident as passed by the caller. Operations control will also notify the Police.

On arrival at any incident, the officer in charge of the first attendance will –

I. Either in person or via a nominated subordinate make contact with Incident Commander, Defence Fire & Rescue and Police Incident Officer, in order to gather information relevant to the current incident

II. Utilise reconnaissance, Vehicle Mounted Data System, operational intelligence and information from Naval personnel representatives to assess the situation

III. Form a plan of action, prioritising rescue, firefighting and measures to deal with hazardous substances or situations, in accordance with documented SFRS procedures

IV. Through liaison with Health Physics personnel and Senior Naval personnel, determine the parameters within which Fire and Rescue Personnel will operate as directed by the Chief Officer (or most Senior Officer with executive authority) in consultation with the SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser.

V. Deploy personnel only after the completion of a Dynamic Risk Assessment following consultation and guidance from the SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser, Health Physics and Senior Naval personnel

VI. Identify and request resources as may be appropriate

VII. Implement the plan, maintaining operational control within the inner cordon and liaising with other emergency services in attendance.

VIII. Continually evaluate the situation, the effectiveness of actions being taken, and any potential for development, preparing to brief a more senior officer on progress

IX. Ensure all safety measures relative to a nuclear incident are strictly adhered to within determined radiation protection criteria for personnel

FEMALE FIREFIGHTERS MUST NOT ENTER A RESTRICTED ZONE

X. Fire and Rescue personnel will not go on board a submarine with a nuclear emergency

XI. Assist Scottish Ambulance Service with decontamination
NOTE
SFRS crews and officers working within the DEPZ or in potentially hazardous areas on the periphery of the DEPZ, will be afforded maximum protective measures and safety for all duties. Where appropriate this will include the issue of PITs and relevant Respiratory Protective Equipment.

Dose Limits
The Ionising Radiation Regulations (2017) set limits for workers. The SFRS has generally adopted these limits.

Male: 20 mSv (milli-sievert) per year or single incident.
Female: 13 mSv in any consecutive period of 3 months

A dose constraint of 5mSv per incident which corresponds to the alarm setting on the electronic personal dosimeters

100 mSv in exceptional circumstances on an informed volunteer basis for life saving or to prevent catastrophic escalation.

In addition to the specified limits for SFRS personnel, consideration must be given to female personnel who are confirmed as being or who could potentially be pregnant or who are breast feeding. Small amounts of radiation may harm the developing foetus and be passed to the child via breast feeding.

The Ionising Radiations Regulations 2017 intimate that during pregnancy or subsequent breast feeding, exposure should not exceed 1mSv.

Oncoming Command Officers, where appropriate, will take command at tactical and strategic levels. These officers will act in consultation with all other agencies present to ensure a co-ordinated response to the incident.

SFRS ATTENDANCE AT THE COSC
Having mobilised the pre-determined attendance to the appropriate rendezvous point (Clyde Naval Base or Operational Berth) Operations Support Centre, will ensure the following attendance at the COSC.

- Fourth Call Officer (Gold Commander)
- Third call officer;
- Second call Officer;
- First call Officer;
- SFRS Radiation Protection Adviser (by telephone initially)
- Loggist;
- STAC representative;
- National Interagency Liaison Officer (NILO).

The actions of the Officers staffing the COSC will be commensurate with activities relating to off-site situations. In particular, this will be to liaise with other agencies and collect all information required, satisfying any inquiry for advice or information from whatever source.
6.5 SCOTTISH AMBULANCE SERVICE

Scottish Ambulance Service Tactical Priorities and Initial Actions

- Command – establish command, control and co-ordination
- Safety – self, crews and patients
- Communications – METHANE reports, ambulance control and responders
- Assessment – resources required, hazards and threats
- Triage – establish primary triage
- Treatment – access patients and begin treatment based on triage priorities
- Transport – distribute patients to definitive care considering capability, capacity, availability and suitability of staff and facilities

Initial actions of the first crew at the scene of a major incident

The initial management of the ambulance service response at the scene will be led by the first crew to arrive at the scene. Whilst undertaking this role, the crew will not become actively involved in the treatment of patients.

Key actions will be to:

- Carry out a quick reconnaissance of the incident site and report back to Control
- Liaise with Police, Fire or other Incident Officers or Site Operators to gather information
- Declare a ‘Major Incident’, as appropriate and act as the initial Ambulance Control Point
- Establish Command, Control and Communications for the Service
- Designate appropriate priority roles to manage ambulance activity at the scene
- Maintain a decision / action log

Dose Limits

Scottish Ambulance Service staff will be guided by the ‘Ambulance Service - Guidance on Dealing with Radiological Incidents & Emergencies”. This specifies the following dose limits:

**Reference level one:** 1 mSv total for all staff per event.

This DRL applies to all general ambulance staff that have not been identified for specialist roles such as SORT.

**Reference level two:** 5 mSv maximum dose per event.

This DRL applies to those staff who have volunteered to be involved in CBRN decontamination roles (Special Operations Response Team – SORT).

**Reference level three:** 100 mSv the maximum dose (for life saving operations) where the casualty cannot be immediately removed from the area of the high dose rate or contamination. All ambulance staff can volunteer to be exposed to this level provided that they have been fully briefed and understand the implications.

**Special Operations Response Team – SORT annual DRL.**

Due to the inner cordon role of SORT there is the potential for them to attend more than one event and receive more than one emergency exposure. Therefore the SORT DRL will be based on an annual (whole body) dose limit of 20 mSv.
6.6 HM COASTGUARD (HMCG)

The Coastguard will open an incident in their Command and Control System and establish communications with the Police Incident Control.

If COSC is activated, HM Coastguard will depending on the health risk consider despatching a suitable personnel to attend. Until the arrival at the COSC of the Coastguard Liaison Personnel, information flow will remain via Police Scotland, either at the COSC or Force Overview.

HM Coastguard will initiate alert broadcasts on radio and satellite systems at the request of the Police Incident Commander / COSC Coastguard Liaison Officer.

HM Coastguard will conduct enquiries to establish the safety of vessels or persons which may be in potential danger areas, in consultation with the Police Incident Commander and COSC Coastguard Liaison Officer.

HM Coastguard may task Coastguard units afloat and on shore to assist the other emergency services and will respond to any other requests through the COSC Liaison
6.7 NHS HIGHLAND

Notification of an incident to Police Scotland or any other agency concerned about public health is important to enable a robust response to meet the needs of the incident to be effected. In the event of a reactor or weapon emergency NHS Highland will respond as soon as notification is received.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The Scottish Ambulance Service provides the emergency health care response of the NHS Scotland. Additional medical support is provided to an incident on the request of the Ambulance Incident Commander (AIC). Support to the incident will arrive from various locations and examples are shown below:

a) Local General Practitioner (GP);
b) Local Community Hospital Staff (A&E nurses);
c) Medical Incident Officer;
d) Site Medical Team;
e) Public Health Team.

Agreement has been reached with the Health Board that MOD will supply teams to issue PITs to residents within the DEPZ. This will be carried out automatically as a precautionary measure, in the very unlikely event of a OSNE being declared.

Any further issue of SITs and distribution teams would be sourced by the health board should the wind change or if the decision is taken to distribute to the Outline Planning Zone.

CASUALTY CARE

When immediate evacuation is an option in the management of casualties, responsibility for the co-ordination falls to the Ambulance Incident Commander (AIC) and the Medical Incident Officer (MIO) or local GP. Designated Receiving Hospitals will be nominated and the evacuation of casualties will be co-ordinated with Ambulance Control. In all major incidents the NHS Board has a responsibility to co-ordinate the information and assess the health care needs. This function is processed in the Board Control Centre which acts as a co-ordination and communication centre for NHS Highland.

PRIMARY HEALTH CARE

As a result of an incident or as a measure of precaution, members of the local population may become displaced and rest centres established to provide shelter and support. Community health support to these facilities will be provided once notification is received from the Local Authority.

PUBLIC HEALTH

There may be a need for the potential effects or implications of the emergency on the health of the public to be considered and managed in the acute and recovery phase of the emergency. This is carried out in conjunction with the NHS and non-NHS Agencies.

Screening facilities will be arranged in conjunction with the local authority.

TACTICAL LEVEL

Notification of a major incident to NHS Management using local call out arrangements will ensure that the management system for allocating resources, the planning and co-
ordination of when a task will be undertaken and action to obtain other resources is established.

Establishment of the Clyde Off-Site Centre will be notified to the NHS Board which will co-ordinate the attendance of NHS managers to the Clyde Off-Site Centre.

The tactical management team may comprise representatives of the following:

a) Scottish Ambulance Service;

b) Public Health Directorate of the NHS Board;

c) Performance Management;

d) Acute Care Providers - Communications/Media Team;

e) Primary Health Care NHS Board - Including Community Health Partnership Management;

f) Voluntary Agencies.

**STRATEGIC LEVEL**

The decision to establish a strategic level of management may occur as a result of a single service or a multi-agency need to affect resolution and to establish a framework of policy for the tactical officers responding to the needs created by the incident.

In addition to the statutory requirements of the Director and Consultants of Public Health Medicine to protect and advise the public on health issues, strategic management could involve a Director or Chief Executive from the NHS Board.

### 6.8 SCOTTISH ENVIRONMENT PROTECTION AGENCY

**AGREED ACTIONS**

**Off-Site Emergency:**

- Provide SEPA representatives at the LRP – Strategic / STAC;
- Set up and staff SEPA Emergency Control Centre;
- Provide advice on the environmental impact of a radiological incident to relevant organisations;
- Provide information on the environmental effects of the incident where appropriate;
- Advise on appropriate disposal of radioactive waste and, if appropriate, authorise such disposals;
- Determine if a breach of site authorisation has occurred and gather relevant information if necessary.

### 6.9 SCOTTISH GOVERNMENT

On receipt of notification of a radiation emergency, the Scottish Government duty officer will –

- Activate its emergency response arrangements, and set up its emergency room, the Scottish Government Resilience Room (SGoRR);
- Deploy a Government Liaison Team including Scottish Government Liaison Officer (SGLO) to the SCC to support the SCG and liaise with SGoRR;
- Alert the WoSRRP Support team who will attend at the COSC as soon as possible.
6.10 FOOD STANDARDS SCOTLAND

The Food Standards Scotland will:

- Attend the Clyde Off-site Centre (COSC), as appropriate
- Provide scientific advice relating to food via the Scientific and Technical Advisory Cell (STAC)
- Provide the precautionary advice area in which relevant Maximum Permitted Levels (MPL’s) in food and feed might be exceeded, as determined by the Food Standards Agency. The areas affected by this precautionary advice can often be much larger than those areas where immediate countermeasures, such as sheltering, have been implemented.
- If it is assessed that levels of radioactivity in any potential food products may exceed (MPL’s), Food Standards Scotland will liaise with Scottish Government Rural Inspections Directorate (SGRPID) and the local authority to gather relevant information on the local area (e.g. the type and extent of regional agricultural practices).
- Liaise with local authorities to take action to ensure that food contaminated to unacceptable levels does not enter the food chain.
- Liaise with relevant partners, as necessary, to implement restriction orders under the Food and Environment Protection Act 1985 (FEPA) to restrict the supply, movement or sale of produce from the affected area.
- Liaise with the Media Briefing cell and prepare press releases to provide advice to the public, businesses and stakeholders regarding any implications for food.
6.11 PUBLIC HEALTH ENGLAND – CENTRE FOR RADIATION, CHEMICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS (PHE-CRCE)

On receipt of an alert, PHE-CRCE will determine the appropriate level of its response to the emergency. This level of response might include **all or some** of the following:

1. Deployment of senior staff to a number of key locations. These would include:
   - The COSC (to provide advice on the Strategic Co-ordinating Group, the Scientific and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and the Recovery Working Group (RWG)).
   - The Media Cell, if required, however, information may be passed through STAC to Strategic Group.
   - The lead Government Department Emergency Centre or COBR as appropriate;
   - The devolved assembly’s emergency centres (as appropriate).

2. Set up an emergency operations centre at CRCE HQ, Chilton. The key functions of this centre will be to gather relevant information (particularly radiation monitoring information), to assess this information and to provide expert advice on the basis of this information.

3. Deploy radiation monitoring teams capable of measuring environmental contamination and measurements of radioactivity on or in people. Support will be provided to Radiation Monitoring Units (RMUs) as appropriate and where resources allow.

4. Undertake the role of national radiation monitoring co-ordination.

5. Provide expert advice on radiological issues for the recovery phase.

6. Liaise effectively with, but not confined to, other key stakeholders in the response at a local, regional and national level including the Food Standards Agency (FSA), Food Standards Scotland (FSS) the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA), Local Authority, Environmental Health and Scottish Water.

6.12 OFFICE FOR NUCLEAR REGULATION (ONR)

On being notified of an OSNE, ONR will:

- Send inspectors to the affected site’s emergency facilities and to the appropriate off-site facility (COSC) who will monitor the situation and the steps taken to restore control and provide advice through the STAC;
- Set up its own Incident Suite at Redgrave Court, Bootle, to provide a technical assessment capability and to support the Senior Nuclear Inspector, the ONR inspectors on the site and at the off-site facility;
- Make independent assessments of the likely course of the emergency, its consequences and consider any implications for other nuclear installations;
- Provide independent advice to the COSC, through the STAC, on the technical prognosis of the emergency and the health protection aspects;
- Deploy a Senior Nuclear Inspector, normally an ONR Deputy Chief Inspector, to the MOD Headquarters, Whitehall. The Senior Nuclear Inspector will act as advisor to central government in nuclear emergencies and will give advice based on ONR’s assessments to government departments, devolved administrations, HSE and the operators as appropriate.
6.13 SCOTTISH WATER

On receipt of a message alerting Scottish Water to the deceleration of an off-site nuclear emergency Scottish Water will arrange for relevant staff to attend the Clyde Off-Site Centre. As an initial minimum a core team of at least two members of staff will be selected from a pool that includes the following initial members:

- A member of Scottish Water’s Resilience & Security Team
- A member of Scottish Water’s Public Health Team;
- A member of Scottish Water’s Operational Management Team;
- A member of the Scottish Water Corporate Affairs Team.

Members of this pool and other staff, will attend the COSC in person and by conference call as agreed with the Strategic LRP.

The key focus of Scottish Water’s actions will be to ensure that it carries out the responsibilities detailed in section 5.14 above.

To support this an initial assessment of the situation will be made.

This assessment will include

- The identification of any immediate risks to Scottish Water staff / contractors;
- The identification of any potential risks to and / or actual impacts on the Public Water Supply (including raw water sources);
- The arrangement and co-ordination of any required sampling and analysis of raw water sources, process waters and treated supplies at risk;
- The collation of available data to enable a valid assessment of the risks to the public water supply by the relevant key partners;
- The provision of advice and support to the Strategic LRP and other key stakeholders;
- Agreement with the Strategic LRP and other key stakeholders with regard to any initial communications passed to Scottish Water’s customers and other stakeholders.

Where required Scottish Water will invoke the appropriate internal and multi-agency incident control plans.

6.14 NETWORK RAIL

In the event of an off-site emergency being declared in respect of HM Naval Base Clyde, Network Rail would assume its role by appointing a Rail Incident Officer (RIO) who would attend at the COSC.

The RIO would liaise with other railway agencies as may be required in respect of the suspension of rail transport on the West Highland Line and on any other affected routes. The RIO would also facilitate any request to use rail services for evacuation or other emergency purposes.

Upon receiving advice that a major incident has occurred then the Route Control Manager at Network Rail Integrated Control will:-

- Ensure that all rail traffic has been stopped on the affected line(s);
- Implement Network Rail’s National Emergency Plan as required.
- Advise the relevant Train Operating or Freight Operating Companies of the Incident;
The Rail Incident Officer will attend the COSC

- Confirm that the site is safe as per bullet one above.
- Assess the situation and advise the Route Control Manager at Network Rail Integrated Control accordingly;
- If a LRP Strategic Group is being set up, ensure that a member of Network Rail Management is attending as required and is advised of the details.

The above response would depend on the extent of the emergency, within 1.5k there should be no need for a Network Rail response.

6.15 MET OFFICE

Actions in the event of an incident:

- The Met Office will provide the emergency authorities with meteorological forecasts, advice and specialist services in the event of any CBRN release into the atmosphere;
- Met Office (EMARC) Forecasters will respond to a telephone call (usually from Fire & Rescue), indicating an emergency, by providing an immediate verbal assessment of the wind direction and an estimate of the likely plume characteristics;
- The forecaster will then provide a more detailed written forecast (PACRAM forecast form B) together with an ‘area at risk’ map of the area. This should be available to responders within 20 minutes of the request. It will be sent via fax and/or email (as required). Note that all PACRAM forecasts are also emailed to PHE – CRCE and Food Standards Agency (FSA) for info. Should other Government agencies make enquiries of the Met Office in relation to the incident (e.g. Police, Local Authority), then the same PACRAM information will be forwarded to that agency;
- The forecaster will contact the incident control centre with updates as appropriate, e.g. possible changes in wind direction and/or respond to requests for further information as required;
- Note that, if requested by the emergency services, the Met Office’s Civil Contingencies Advisors can attend the incident control centre to provide direct liaison between the incident commanders and forecasters at the Met Office HQ. (See contact details at Section 10).

The role of an advisor during an incident is:

1. To ensure that the management teams are aware of all the meteorological factors that may impact on the incident.
2. To ensure consistency of information and that all responders within ‘Strategic’ are able to utilise this information.
3. Where required, to interpret this information for the responders.
4. To source other scientific advice available from the Met Office (e.g. from dispersion scientists) and to act as a point of contact between the Met Office and responders. This will free up responder’s resources to enable them to utilise their specific skills effectively.
5. Respond to weather related enquiries.
6. If required and appropriate, to arrange for routine forecasts and other information to be supplied in the recovery phase.

7. To assist in the audit trail by documenting all meteorological requests/d responses.

8. Information on any plume, including all PACRAM forecasts, can be uploaded on to the Met Office Hazard Manager website so that all information is available to all responders. Contact the regional Civil Contingencies Advisor to activate the site and to permit access to responders. Hazard Manager is available to all CAT 1 and CAT 2 responders at all times.

6.16 ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH AGENCY - APHA

APHA acts as the Regulator on behalf of Scottish Government, for animal welfare monitoring. Support for FSS in helping to enforce restrictions on the control of the production and supply of contaminated or potentially contaminated food stuffs.

APHA will also advise on the disposal of animal by-products. This could be potentially a significant issue in the aftermath of any off-site incident, and will be done in conjunction with other bodies such as SEPA.

‘The Animal Plant Health Agency is an Executive Agency of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs working across Great Britain on behalf of Defra. Scottish Government and Welsh Government, to safeguard animal and plant health for the benefit of people, the environment and the economy’
6.17 GOVERNMENT DECONTAMINATION SERVICE - GDS

UK Government Decontamination Service (GDS)

GDS is part of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and is concerned with the recovery of the open and built environment following a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) or major hazardous materials (HAZMAT) incident.

GDS’s primary functions are -

- To provide advice, guidance and assistance on decontamination related issues to responsible authorities in their contingency planning for, and response to, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) and major HAZMAT incidents
  - CBRN – a deliberate act involving Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear materials.
  - Major HAZMAT – an accident, regardless of scale, involving Chemical, Biological, Radioactive or Nuclear materials where the incident is in excess of local capability and/or knowledge and authorities request GDS services.
- To maintain and build on the GDS framework of specialist suppliers and ensure that responsible authorities have access to these services if the need arises
- To advise central Government on the national capability for the decontamination of buildings, infrastructure, transport and open environment, and be a source of expertise in the event of a CBRN incident or major release of HAZMAT materials

Contact Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>24/7 Emergency On Call Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>If GDS is unavailable contact the Defra Duty Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Enquiries (office hours only)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

GDS’s operational capability includes -

- Facilitate the rapid decontamination of CBRN releases using private-sector capability
- On call 24/7 to provide access to GDS expertise and Framework services
- Provide expert scientific and technical advice to relevant groups, including Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC) and Recovery Co-ordination Group (RCG), on the most appropriate decontamination methods

GDS also produces the Strategic National Guidance: The decontamination of buildings, infrastructure and the open environment exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials.

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications战略性的国家指导：建筑物、基础设施和开放环境的去污，暴露于化学、生物、放射性或核材料

SECTION 7 – TRANSITION TO RECOVERY

7.1 TRANSITION CRITERIA

Prescribing the criteria necessary for initiation of the transition of Strategic Coordination to the Local Authority.

Purpose

The response to any nuclear reactor emergency will involve two clear phases of response:

a) **the emergency phase** during which the actions of the incident responders will be determined by the chain of events and the situations arising from the release of radio-nuclides, secondary threats (explosion, fire, etc) and the need to protect the public (shelter, food and water sources). This is led by the Chief Constable for Police Scotland.

b) **The recovery phase** is the process of “returning to normality” after the emergency incident has ceased. This is led by the Chief Executive of Argyll and Bute Council.

These are not two distinct phases and the transition will happen gradually during the course of an emergency. The transition to the proactive phase of the response, the Recovery Phase, must itself be planned and prepared for. This work will commence during the emergency phase where the Recovery Working Group will be tasked with the remit of identifying the nature and extent of off-site contamination arising from the emergency as well as strategies and options for the protection of the communities affected by the emergency and the return to “normality”. Please see Figure 1 below:

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Figure 1: Diagram illustrating the transition from response to recovery phases with key factors such as status of nuclear facility, radioactive release, public protection, operational plan, radiological exposure framework, radiological monitoring and sampling, and focus areas.
Transition arrangements from ‘Emergency’ to ‘Recovery’

The basis for any decision to handover to the local authority will relate to:

i. The change in emphasis from reactive (responding) to proactive actions (planning),

ii. The effectiveness of the off-site coordination,

iii. The willingness of the Chief Constable to declare that the emergency phase is concluded; and

iv. The preparedness of the local authority to accept the responsibility.

The following circumstances should prevail before the transition can be considered appropriate:

a. The reactor emergency has ceased

The reactor emergency is deemed to have ceased when:

- The reactor is stable;
- Emissions to all phases of the environment have ceased;
- There is no foreseeable risk of a further release of radionuclide material;
- The vessel is secured against movement and is not exposed to external hazards e.g. fire, explosion.

b. No significant issues remain unresolved from the Emergency Phase

No significant issues remain unresolved when:

- The COSC is firmly established in a pro-active mode, and is no longer having to react to external events;
- The management of outstanding matters is being progressed and managed effectively, the COSC having the necessary:-
  i. Resources;
  ii. Communications and “action logging” systems;
  iii. Established media co-ordination arrangements.

c. Public safety measures are in place and working effectively

There is restricted public movement.

d. There is consensus support for the handover between the “Principals”

There is consensus support for the handover when:-

- The MOD Co-ordinating Authority and Local Authority Chief Executive support the decision of the Police Incident Commander to handover to the Local Authority;
- The Scottish Government supports the handover.
The Council is prepared and ready to accept the handover, and to adopt the role of COSC Co-ordinator

The proposal has been intimated at the preceding meeting of the COSC LRP Strategic.

7.2 The Process

A formal handover will take place from the Police Strategic Incident Commander to the Local Authority Chief Executive. This signifies the formal transfer to the Recovery phase. At that time, the Chief Executive of Argyll and Bute Council will assume Chair of the LRP Strategic from the Senior Police Officer and will use the Standard meeting agenda (see Appendix 1).
APPENDIX 1 - STANDARD AGENDA - LRP STRATEGIC

STANDARD AGENDA FOR LRP - STRATEGIC ON TRANSFER TO RECOVERY PHASE OF INCIDENT

LRP - STRATEGIC

AGENDA

Time: ________________________________  Date: ________________________________

DRAFT PRESS RELEASES WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO MEMBERS PRIOR TO MEETING

1  Strategic Introduction  Chief Executive
2  Matters requiring urgent action/decisions  LRP - Strategic Members
3  Actions from previous meetings  CE Support Officer
4  Operational updates  LRP - Strategic Members
5  Review / formulation of:
   •  Emergency Response  Chair
   •  Recovery Strategy  Local Authority (Chair RWG)
   •  Public Health Advice  NHS Member
   •  Media Strategy/Public Advice  Communications Manager–Argyll & Bute
5  Review of consequence management issues  LRP - Strategic Members
7  Overall strategy (short, medium and long-term)  Chair
8  Agreed Media communications  All
9  Summary of actions allocated during meeting  CE Support Officer
10  Arrangements for next meeting  Chair

This Standing Agenda is of a similar format to that used in the emergency phase when LRP Strategic is chaired by Strategic Commander – Police Scotland.
8.1 GENERAL

It is essential that all agencies develop a frank and open relationship with the media in order to lessen the likelihood of dissemination of inaccurate or misleading information that could lead to unnecessary public alarm. Police Scotland Media / Public Communications are responsible for the co-ordination of information to the media during the emergency phase of the incident, so will therefore be led by the Police Scotland Public Communication Manager. Some key aspects of this responsibility will be transferred to the local authority when the response moves into the recovery phase.

The above will be carried out in accordance with the WoSRRP Public Communications Plan.

8.2 MEDIA BRIEFING CENTRE

All local media activities in the event of a radiological emergency are conducted from the Media Briefing Centre located on the ground floor of the COSC. Information supplied to the media is co-ordinated by the Media Cell in the COSC and issued only after the agreement of the LRP Strategic Group.

8.3 PRESS STATEMENTS

All initial announcements (made before the establishment of the COSC) should be confined to brief factual details that are aimed at public safety information (See 9.5 Emergency Broadcast).

It is important to get this out as soon as possible after the Cascade call out, if necessary, before the COSC is operational. Therefore, the Emergency Broadcast is prepared and agreed in advance and appears in this off-site plan for easy access.

Once the COSC is operational, any press statements should be issued only through the Media Cell to ensure that no conflicting information is being passed to the media.

To ensure co-ordination and continuity of information, the press officers from each agency should co-locate to the Media Cell which will be under the management of the Police Scotland Public Communications Manager.

A copy of the first agreed Press Release is printed in Section 9.6, page 95. This can also be used early on, before Tactical/Strategic groups meet.

8.4 PRESS CONFERENCE

Once the objectives and participants for the Press Conference have been agreed, a separate pre-meeting will be held of the participants in the press conference. This will be chaired by the Police Media and Information Manager and will run through the key points of each participant’s statement thus ensuring the objectives are met. This meeting will take place in the LRP Strategic room.

8.5 MEDIA LIAISON OFFICER(S)

Police Media Liaison Officers may be appointed to co-ordinate media access to nominated vantage points near the site or at other locations.
SECTION 9 - WARNING AND INFORMING THE PUBLIC

9.1 WARNING THE PUBLIC

The local authority is responsible for providing, on a three yearly basis, advice to residents who live within the 1.5km DEPZ on the actions they should take immediately they are made aware of a radiation emergency.

9.2 INFORMING THE PUBLIC

The duty to provide information to the public is that of the local authority under The Radiation (Emergency Preparedness and Public Information) Regulations 2019 (REPPIR). This duty can only be carried out with the support and co-operation of all the agencies responding to the emergency.

However, in the emergency phase of the incident, the **co-ordination of information** to the public will fall to Police Scotland Media and Information Services in line with the WoSRRP Public Communication Plan, with support from the Communication Managers from MOD and Local Authority. In the **recovery phase** some key roles in the co-ordination arrangements will be transferred to the local authority.

Information to the public will be disseminated through all the normal media channels, and in addition, **information points** may be established if considered necessary and agreed by the Strategic group. These are where people might visit to ask questions relating to the incident. Questions might relate to:

a) Up to date information on the emergency situation;

b) Safety of family and friends;

c) Safety of food and water supplies;

d) Compensation claims;

e) Housing and property enquiries.

The most appropriate location for information points will be established at the time of the incident, but may be in local libraries, council offices or similar premises. The information made available to these information points will be provided by the Public Communications cell and resources to manage this will have to be identified in advance of set-up.

9.3 HELPLINE(S)

If any agency sets up its own telephone help line, they must maintain a close link with the Media Cell at the COSC to ensure clarity of information for callers. If a Helpline is to be set-up, this must be agreed by the Strategic group in order to ensure that the best use is made of the resource, for example through questions asked are raised with the media and public communications cell, also to ensure that information is being disseminated through it.

9.4 WEBSITE INFORMATION

Information will also be made available by way of regular updates on the Argyll and Bute Council, Police Scotland and MOD Websites.
9.5 EMERGENCY BROADCAST - REACTOR

The following statement should only be released after consultation with the Assistant Chief Constable (Operations) or the Duty Assistant Chief Constable and the Senior Police Press Officer.

POLICE SCOTLAND
EMERGENCY BROADCAST

OFF-SITE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY (REACTOR)
PUBLIC WARNING

Emergency services are attending an incident that occurred at around
………………………………………………………… (time) today ……………………. (date)

Involving the reactor systems of a nuclear powered submarine at
…………………………………………………………………………………….. (location).

* There are no reports of casualties.
* There are casualties although exact details are not yet available.
* A radiation hazard has/has not been detected outside the Naval Base.
* A release of radioactive material has/has not been detected.

(* delete as appropriate)

The situation is being evaluated by base personnel who are working with the civilian emergency services and local authorities.

As a precaution, residents and people travelling in the ………………………………..(areas) are advised to go indoors, stay there and take the following actions:

1. Close all doors and windows.
2. Switch off extractor fans, close ventilators and damp down/extinguish open fires.
3. Do not collect children at school, the school authorities will look after them.
4. Do not leave the area; you will be much safer indoors.
5. Listen for further information on local radio or television.
6. Do not use the telephone unless you need urgent help.

Food and drink in your house and tap water from public supplies are unlikely to be affected. Government agencies will provide advice to users of private water supplies and on consumption of other foodstuffs.
As a further precautionary measure the issue of Stable Iodine Tablets within the affected areas is being implemented and further information will follow. Residents who have a copy of the MOD REPPIR booklet ‘What to do in a Radiation Emergency’ should refer to it for advice.

There is no need for anyone to take special action if they are out with the affected areas, although people intending to travel towards or within the affected area are advised to postpone their arrangements until further notice.

NOTE

This following will not form part of the press release

Notes for Editors

(name) Police Scotland Media and Public Communications are on route to the MOD’s COSC at Rhu where media facilities are being/have been established. Media representatives, who should bear some form of professional/company accreditation, are asked to rendezvous there.

Further information and advice regarding the incident will be given in due course, along with details of the Centre’s telephone numbers.

The COSC and Media Briefing Centre is situated on the seaward side of the main A814 Helensburgh to Garelochhead road opposite the Ardencaple Hotel in Rhu. Please park at the direction of the police.
9.6 PRESS RELEASE

Incident at ____________________________ (insert site)

We can confirm that an incident has taken place at ____________________ (location), around (time) today (date). Emergency services are on the scene and are working together with the Royal Navy, the local authority and other agencies to deal with the incident.

At this time it is too early to say what has happened, but a full investigation will take place once the immediate situation has been dealt with.

An emergency broadcast has already been issued to the media, and public in the immediate area are asked to listen for further updates from local radio.

Staff from Police Scotland Media and Public Communications are on their way to set up a Media Briefing Centre at the COSC in Rhu, Argyll.

It is anticipated that a full statement of the latest facts will be made at a press conference in the COSC at the earliest opportunity. All further media statements on this incident will be made through the Media Briefing Centre only.

Media are asked to attend at the COSC on the A814 at Rhu where police officers will direct you to parking facilities within the centre grounds.

Media are asked to bring proof of identity.